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COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT SCALES:
THE STATE OF THE ART
John F. Else
School of Social Work
University of Iowa
Samuel E. Walker
Department of Criminal Justice
University of Nebraska at Omaha

Community development activities are founded on
the assumption that citizens have some concept
of a "good community" toward which they want to
move.
Attention needs to be given to how community developers can determine citizen values and
attitudes about the type of community that they
want. Community assessment scales (CAS's) have
been used as one means of measuring community
attitudes and desires.
This paper explores the state of the art of the
development and use of CAS's.
The conclusions
are that there has been only minimal use of CAS's
and that there are many conceptual and methodological problems with the existing
scales.
It is suggested that CAS's, if properly designed,
could be useful and practical tools for community development.

Community developers are constantly seeking to mobilize
people to improve the quality of life in the communities
or neighborhoods in which they live and work. Most community developers operate with unspoken -- and perhaps unclarified -- assumptions about what kind of community they
desire or believe that the people in the community desire.
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It would seem apparent that if community developers are
serious about wanting to enable a community to fulfill its
own goals for itself, they would want to discover, by some
systematic means, what the citizens want the community to
be -- how they define a "good community" (23). One of the
means that has been used to achieve this end is survey
research designed to identify people's preferences about
various aspects of community life -- either how they evaluate present aspects of their communities or what kinds of
improvements that they would like to see in their communities.
We surveyed the literature in several disciplines to analyze the various kinds of community attitude survey instruments that have been developed. In selecting the "community assessment scales" to be analyzed, we included only
those that sought to measure fairly broad aspects of the
community. We excluded, therefore, scales that focused
only on specific, limited aspects or institutions of
communities.
We found, first of all, that relatively little research has
been directed toward measuring citizen attitudes toward
the community. We were able to identify only twenty scales.
(We will not analyze all twenty scales, but only illustrative ones within each of the categories we have developed.)
Some had apparently never been used in research studies (or
the results have never been published) and in other cases
the research was reported but the scales were not presented. Many of the available community assessment scales
were extremely rudimentary.
We also found that the content of the scales was seldom
related to clear definitions of the central concepts used
nor to theories which would identify the major variables
which should be considered in developing a concept of "good
community." Only a few scales organize the responses into
sophisticated analytical categories and are cognizant of
the methodological problems inherent in this type of
research.
In the following analysis of community assessment scales,
we divide the scales into three categories. Each category

reflects a particular set of concerns, a distinct purpose,
and a specific orientation to quality of life in a community; we try to make these underlying orientations explicit. Then we describe the content of specific scales
within each category -- the types of questions and formats
used to obtain the data. Finally, we discuss conceptual
and methodological problems and explore the potential for
using community assessment scales to help citizens identify community development goals.
TYPES OF SCALES
The three categories we developed to delineate different
types of community assessment scales were:
(a) Urban
Planning Scales, which focused primarily on the physical
and ecological aspects of the community; (b) Intergroup
Relations Scales, which focused on class, status, and
suburban/urban differences; and (c) Social Institutions
and Social Milieu Scales, which focused on attitudes toward
various coimmunity institutions and aspects of community
spirit, cohesion, and commitment.
A.
1.

Urban Planning Scales

Purpose/Orientation
A majority of the available community assessment scales
were developed in the context of the urban planning
process. This should hardly be surprising. The urban
renewal/redevelopment process, whether in the form of
developing new communities or in renovating existing
communities, necessarily involves the question of how
residents, or potential residents, perceive that community.
Physical planners have not always made this affirmation, however. The struggle within the profession is
whether the planners know better than the residents
what factors contribute most to community cohesion and
to the happiness of its residents. Neighborhood residents have often rejected the concepts and priorities
of the planners. As Lansing and Marans (14) observed,
-301-

"widespread resistance to planning proposals, particularly urban renewal projects, seems to indicate that
citizens and planners disagree over what a high qualEvidently planners have been
ity environment may be."
slow to accept Mel Ravitz's (22) statement of twenty
years ago, that "increasingly, physical planners are
coming to recognize that to be effective sound physical planning must be related to the accepted wants and
Thus community
needs of neighborhood residents."
assessment scales serve as a means of narrowing the
social and cultural gap between the "experts" and the
residents.
Some specific examples of the research in this category will illustrate the diversity of purposes.
Lansing, Marans, and Zehner (14, 15, 25) undertook a
comparative study of planned new towns and unplanned
Zehner (25) explained that the
suburban communities.
project was undertaken "to see if differential satisfactions were related to identifiable aspects of the
environment that would be amenable to manipulation by
planners." This particular group of studies measured
the attitudes of residents who were either contemplating, or had recently made, a major change in residential location. Thus, it involved a conscious choice
between alternative communities.
The Booth (3) study of "Metropolitics" in Nashville,
Tennessee involves a somewhat different planning
the adoption of a unified governmental strucissue:
ture for the entire metropolitan region. The author
sought to identify sources of resistance to the metropolitan plan. Metropolitan consolidation, it should
be noted, has long been an important issue for urban
planning.
The Lansing and Hendricks (13) study arose from an
attempt to develop a comprehensive transportation and
land use policy for the Detroit metropolitan region.
The authors sought "to provide planners -- and political decision makers -- with information needed to
develop workable plans which are consistent with the
needs and desires of the citizens and with their
patterns of behavior."
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Ravitz (22) reported on two surveys used in neighborhood planning. One of the studies concerned a neighborhood where a conservation and preservation project
was underway. It sought to determine what aspects of
the neighborhood the residents were most and least
satisfied with, in order to establish priorities for
the project.
These illustrations demonstrate the diversity of purposes for community assessment scales used in urban
planning. Their focus is similar, however. They tend
to emphasize the physical and ecological aspects of
community. They concentrate on attitudes toward the
type and availability of housing and the travel time
between residences, workplaces, and shopping areas.
These issues reflect the traditional orientation of
urban planners on the more manipulable physical characteristics of community rather than the more elusive
social aspects.
2.

Content of the Scales
As previously mentioned, many of the scales used in
studies we found cited are either not published at all
or would be difficult to obtain. For example, Ravitz
(22) discusses two studies, neither of which is available in an easily accessible form. Thus we have selected for illustration of the content of urban planning
scales, three of the scales that were discussed in
some detail in a book or journal article.
Lamanna (12) developed one of the most elaborate scales
in his study of value consensus.
He included thirteen
items, divided between the general categories of
Physical Values and Social Values. Physical Values
included: Accessibility (distance to schools and
shopping centers); Amenity (the number of parks,
quietness of the neighborhood); and, Mobility (the
quality of sidewalks, roads, etc.).
Social Values
included:
Status (socio-economic level of the population and the image of the community vis-a-vis other
communities); Autonomy (the ability to be oneself and
-303-

to be free from the scrutiny of others); Sociability
(the friendliness of people and the proximity of
friends); and, Heterogeneity (the diversity of the
resident population).
Lamanna sought to discover the relative importance of
the various aspects of community life in the overall
assessment of the community. He found that "considerably more importance is placed upon the social
values than upon the physical values." The Lamanna
scale did not measure attitudes toward the physical
appearance of the community, the quality of social
services, or the degree of participation in community
institutions.
Lansing and Marans (14) defined "neighborhood quality"
in terms of the Physical, the Social, and the Symbolic.
Physical aspects included housing style, landscaping
and the proximity of services. Social aspects included the friendliness of neighbors and the ethno-religious-economic composition of the population. The
Symbolic aspect dealt with community's sense of identity and its prestige relative to other communities.
The authors did not publish their scale, but it appears
that most of the items dealt with the physical aspects
of the neighborhood.
The Lansing and Marans study included a comparison of
ratings by community residents and professional
planners. Significantly, they found only a moderate
degree of agreement (bivariate correlation coefficient,
(r = .35) and indicated that social factors were more
important to residents than to planners.
Booth (3), in his study of metropolitanization, presented respondents with a list of eight "values" and
asked them to list the three which would be most
important to them in choosing a place to live. The
items, ranked by the number of times mentioned by
respondents, were:
Desirable and healthy neighborhood in which to
raise children
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Better property values for the money
Closeness to big stores, to work and to professional services
Good municipal services, e.g., sewers, sidewalks,
police and firemen
Less politics, less red tape and less corruption
in public offices
Lower taxes
Opportunity for civic participation
Fashionable and stylish neighborhood
B.
1.

Intergroup Relations Scales

Purpose/Orientation
Several studies focused on the relations, or perceived
relations, between different groups within communities.
Implicit in these studies is the effort to resolve
differences and promote community integration.
A number of studies in this group are concerned with
questions of class and status. Bauman (2), for example, investigated the relationship between status
inconsistency and community satisfaction, operating on
the premise that "persons with inconsistent statuses
are more likely to experience dissatisfaction with the
community than persons with consistent statuses."
Hetzler (11) focused on the relationship between social
mobility and the political outlook of residents, while
Durana and Eckart (6) investigated the effect of social
rank on community attitudes.
Another group of studies within this category investigate issues related to suburbanization. Morgan (19)
studied the relationship between social rank and attitudes toward suburbanization, while Munson (19) investigated the question of why certain residents chose to
live in the suburbs rather than the inner city. The
Morgan and Munson studies resemble the urban planning
studies in that they focus on the choice between alternative communities; however, the primary concern in
the Morgan and Munson studies was the absence of
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social integration on the metropolitan level. Munson
made his problem/policy orientation explicit: he
sought to "facilitate the proper focus of attention of
city planners in their efforts to cope with the exodusfrom-the-city movement." Morgan sought to promote
community integration by aiding "those in policymaking positions who are searching for ways to close
the gap between suburbia and the central city."
The inner city-suburb studies, which arise from a
concern over the absence of community integration,
raise an important methodological problem for all
community assessment efforts: the problem of defining
ecologically what one means by "community." We shall
return to this question later.
2.

Content of the Scales
The studies by Bauman, Munson and Morgan utilized
relatively unsophisticated attitude scales. Bauman
(2), for example, asked "considering everything, would
you say you are satisfied or dissatisfied with this
city as a place to live?" Respondents indicated their
attitude on a five-point likert-type scale. Munson
(20) utilized open-ended questions on such subjects as:
the "most-liked" and the "most-disliked" features of
the community; reasons for moving to the present location; the attributes of the "good neighborhood" and
the "bad neighborhood," and so on. Morgan (19) began
by asking "what do you like about living in (a
suburb)?" and "are there any reasons in particular
why you might not want to live in Oklahoma City?" He
then followed these general questions with a series of
questions about attitudes toward more specific issues.
Several studies attempted to measure the respondent's
"satisfaction" with the community. Hetzler (11), for
example, used four scales measuring satisfaction with
the town, satisfaction with the general economic
opportunities within the city, satisfaction with the
city's industries, and satisfaction with the city's
government. The author's published article, however,
does not describe the specific content of the scale
-306-

items; nor does he define precisely what is meant by
the term "satisfaction."
C.
1.

Social Institutions and Social Milieu Scales

Purpose/Orientation
A large body of literature exists which measure attitudes toward particular community institutions such as
schools, the police, etc. While these studies are not
the concern of this review, a few do include attempts
to measure the attitude of residents toward the community as a whole.
In one of the earliest attitude scales developed,
Bosworth (4) sought to measure "progressive" and
"unprogressive" political attitudes with reference to
specific community policy issues. His scale includes
a number of questions designed to measure the respondent's attitude toward the community as a whole.
Fessler (7), meanwhile, sought to measure the degree
of community solidarity and the extent to which that
was expressed in institutionalized behavior (in this
instance, farmer cooperatives). This study also
measured the respondent's assessment of community
institutions in general. The New York State Citizen's
Council (21) in 1952 developed an extremely simple
rating schedule designed to assess the perceived needs
of the comunity. The ABT Associates (1) included
four questions concerning the community as a whole in
their attitude survey related to the Small Schools
Project in Rural Areas.
These scales also tend to focus on the degree of participation in the community institutions and on
factors such as community spirit and interpersonal
relationships. Thus, like the intergroup relations
category, they are concerned with the issue of community integration and cohesion, but without the assumption of specific types of group differences and
without the specific goal of resolving these differences.
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2.

Content of Scales
Bosworth (4) divided sixty items among three subscales: Community Services; Community Integration;
and Civic Responsibility. His scale emphasized participation and receipt of services. Using a likerttype scale, he asked interviewees to respond to
statements such as "communities have too many youth
programs," and "a progressive community must provide
adequate parking facilities."
Fessler (7) divided forty items among eight major
areas of community life: community spirit, interpersonal relations, family responsibility toward the
community, schools, churches, economic behavior,
local government, and tension areas. Using a likerttype scale, respondents were asked to assess the degree
to which individual statements accurately described
their community.
The New York State Citizen's Council (21) scale consisted of ten items, each focused on a different institutional area of community life: education, housing
and planning, religion, equality of opportunity, economic development, cultural opportunities, recreation,
health and welfare, government, and community organization. The scale was published as a recommended tool
by the Citizen's Council and there is no published
research that utilized this scale.
The scale developed by the ABT Associates (1) contained four questions, arranged in a logical progression. It asked respondents to indicate: 1) how
important they considered different areas of community
life; 2) the degree to which they participated in the
operations of these different areas; 3) how satisfied
they were with the services they received; and 4)
whether or not they felt they had an equal opportunity
to receive benefits and services. Each of the items
asked the interviewee to respond on a likert-type
scale to fifteen different aspects of community life:
schools, jobs, public welfare, local government, health
services, environmental protection, housing, economic
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institutions, social services, communications, media,
transportation, criminal justice systems, recreation,
churches, and family life.
THE RUSSELL SAGE STUDY
Before turning to methodological problems, we must discuss
briefly a very thorough and comprehensive study of how
people feel about the quality of their lives. The Russell
Sage Foundation supported research by Angus Campbell,
Philip Converse, and Willard Rodgers, all affiliated with
the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan.
Their book, The Quality of American Life: Perceptions,
Evaluations and Satisfactions (5), includes the complete
45 page questionnaire that was used to gather the data.
They were concerned about people's "sense of well-being."
The questionnaire, as well as the organization of the book,
reflects their division of this sense of well-being into
several "domains": residential environment, the nation,
work, marriage and family life, and personal resources and
personal competence. Each domain includes several aspects
of personal and community life. For example, residential
environment included questions on housing, public institutions and services, and climate. Personal resources and
personal competence included money, education, occupational status, physical fitness, social support and affection, intelligence, and command of goods and services.
It might be said that the residential environment questions
constituted a community assessment scale. However, the
authors make clear the interdependency of the various
domains, which suggests that the concept of a community
assessment scale needs to take these other domains into
consideration in trying to determine how people feel about
a community and what they want in a community. The lengthy
questionnaire would be difficult to use in community
development or planning activities, but it represents a
major step forward in the development of a usable scale-and includes an extensive discussion of the theoretical
foundation for the scale.
-309-

METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

There are several methodological problems with the community assessments scales that we have described. One of
the most crucial problems is that "community" is not
clearly defined in most of the scales--nor are clear
distinctions drawn between "neighborhoods" and "communities". Consequently respondents may answer questions with
one concept in mind while the researcher had quite another.
Also, this lack of definitional clarity makes comparisons
among research studies virtually meaningless. Researchers
who propose to undertake future assessment must be cognizant of this problem and give attention to the discriminatory power of their survey instruments.
Similar vagueness and multiple meanings are present in the
use of the term "satisfaction." Some scales define it
fairly specifically, for example, as effective participation in specific organizations or as receipt of particular
services. Other studies define satisfaction in terms of
personal perceptions and feelings, sometimes related to
specific aspects of the community such as housing, parks,
streets, et., and other times related in more abstract
notions such as safety and community spirit. Precision
in the definition of "satisfaction" is important both to
the clarity of the findings and to intra-study comparisons.
Durand and Eckart's article (6) raises two other methodological problems of note. One is the problem of self-selection. They argue that "most people probably select neighborhoods for residence which they expect will maximize
their satisfaction with life in the community." Consequently it is difficult to get a full picture of the impact
of a particular ecological context upon residents. Those
who would definitely not like a particular location choose
not to live there.
One problem of Durand and Eckart's discussion of selfselection is that it assumes that all people have the
resources to make effective choices. We know that this is
not the case and many people are forced to accept less
satisfactory (or unsatisfactory) alternatives may not
express their real desires.
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The other methodological problem raised by Durand and
Eckart is the static quality of most of the research.
Since the data is usually based on information gathered in
a single point in time, the measures fail to take into
account the affects of the dynamic impact of either longterm changes in the neighborhood structure and composition
or temporary distortions of attitudes caused by dramatic
episodes.
Finally, there is the problem common to all studies based
on attitude tests, namely the uncertainty about the extent
to which expressed attitudes are translated into overt
behavior. The studies by Lansing, Marans, and Zehner (14,
15, 25) have the advantage of being aimed at people who
had just undergone or were about to undergo a change in
residence, so they were testing attitudes that had or
would actually shape behavior in residential choices.
THEORETICAL PROBLEMS AND POTENTIAL
The theoretical problems with community assessment scales
are much more serious than the methodological ones, in
that they raise questions about the basic assumptions of
the studies. Most of the scales do not explore basic
Nor
value issues such as those presented by Warren (23).
are the items clearly derived from value options so that
citizens can express preferences which indirectly reflect
alternative value choices. In fact, there is little evidence that the researchers have conceived of the scales
as tools for building theory related to concepts of a
"good community."
The concept of the "good community"
could then be used to evaluate various policy options
which will either reinforce or diminish the realization of
those values, to organize citizens to press for changes
that will move the community toward its ideal.
It is unlikely that community assessment scales will serve
this function, however, as long as they continue to be
used simply to test community response to (or to justify)
specific program and policy proposals. Community developers and others with interest in the broader issues of
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what constitutes a "good community" will need to take
leadership in the design and use of these potentially
useful barometers of citizen values and ideals. Proper
use of community assessment scales could serve to establish
the goals for community developers.
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MODELS OF POVERTY AND PLANNED CHANGE:
A FRAMEWORK FOR SYNTHESIS
David S. Walls
College of Social Professions
University of Kentucky

Recent discussions of planned social change have organized
interventive strategies into models which identify underlying
philosophical assumptions, value orientations, and political perspectives. Two papers published in 1965 can be taken as the
beginning of this model-building discussion: Richard Walton pro1
posed a dichotomy between attitude change and power strategies,
and Roland Warren outlined a continuum from collaborative through
campaign to contest strategies. 2 In the subsequent literature,
three publications stand out as major formulations of models of
planned social change. What is particularly striking is that each
develops a trichotomous typology of change strategies.
Jack Rothman (1968) formulates the Locality Development, Social Planning,
and Social Action models; 3 Robert Chin and Kenneth Benne (1969)
formulate the Rational-Empirical, Normative/Re-Educative, and PowerCoercive models; 4 and James Crowfoot and Mark Chesler (1974) formulate the Countercultural, Professional-Technical, and Political
5
models.
The models developed in each of these major publications
parallel one another. It is clear that each is describing roughly
the same three perspectives on planned change. Crowfoot and Chesler
use the term "meta-strategies" to emphasize the underlying assumptions that provide the basis for distinguishing among the models,
but they do not ask whether there is a theoretical grounding for
these three and only three meta-strategies. It is conceivable that
these are just three of several models that might be identified.
Interpreted in terms of a theoretical framework put forth by
JUrgen Habermas, the three meta-strategies can be seen to represent
three basic dimensions of human society.
For Habermas, there are
three fundamental conditions or media through which social systems
are maintained: interaction, work, and power or domination. All
human societies use these means to resolve the problems of preserving
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life and culture. Corresponding to each of these media are the
human "interests" in mutual understanding, technical control, and
"emancipation from seemingly 'natural' constraint." Derived from
these human interests are the systematic sciences of human action:
the historical-hermeneutic sciences, the empirical-analytic
sciences, and the critical sciences. 6 The major typologies, therefore, do not merely present three of a long list of possible models
of strategies for planned change. They represent fundamental
dimensions of social life, and may well be exhaustive of possible
alternatives if stated in a sufficiently general form 7 (see Table I).
Chin and Benne achieve the most general formulation of the
approaches to planned social change with their Normative-Reeducative, Rational-Empirical, and Power-Coercive models. These
correspond to Habermas' media of human systems maintenance of interaction, work, and power, and to the human interests in mutual
understanding, technical control, and emancipation. The need for
what Habermas calls an historical-hermeneutic approach to human
interaction is apparent in Chin and Benne's statement of the
assumptions of the Normative-Reeducative model:
Intelligence is social, rather than narrowly individual.
Men are guided in their actions by socially funded and
communicated meanings, norms, and institutions, in brief
by a normative culture. At the personal level, men are
guided by internalized meanings, habits, and values.
Changes in patterns of action or practices are, therefore,
changes, not alone in the rational informational equipment
of men, but at the personal level, in habits and values
as well and, at the sociocultural level, changes are
alternatives in normative structures and in institutionalized roles and relationshi s, as well as in cognitive
and perceptual orientations.9
Rothman labels his models within a narrower tradition of the social
work profession's approaches to community organization practice,
but his model of Locality Development clearly falls within a
Normative-Reeducative approach, particularly in the sense of
community development as field education. From this perspective
it is apparent that Crowfoot and Chesler have drawn their Countercultural model too narrowly. It is only one approach from a
variety of change strategies based within the sphere of culture,

-317-

0--4
0 0
0 -4rt- w (P
40

-

0-,-4
-44 (
tn
0 .1

4

rd

P0 -4

-1
-4

1$44)

0

Idu

>

(D
-1H

I ,-I

4.3 0

-M
-04

1 -H
w
0

0

,,'.4
41

94

~

fu
-

H

°0
:

4-

8

) 404

-,'.4
r)(d1i
4

0

r-4

0

r4d

-4
-4
A

r.

-

.,14

0'd0

md
in-

0
4J

-4

-1
w 4)
g00

4

-318-

1
0

18)

and therefore it fails to attain the level of generality of Chin
and Benne's Normative-Reeducative model.
Crowfoot and Chesler's Professional-Technical and Political
models, on the other hand, correspond well in generality with Chin
and Benne's Rational-Empirical and Power-Coercive models. Both sets
of writers agree that the Empirical-Rational/Professional-Technical
approach emphasizes scientific and technical knowledge acquired and
utilized by experts within bureaucratic organizations. Rothman's
model of Social Planning identifies an important professional tradition within this framework of instrumental rationality. Similarly,
the Political/Power-Coercive models point to the importance of
political and economic power in the perpetuation of inequality and
privilege. Rothman's Social Action model includes a number of
political change approaches ranging from Alinsky-type organizations
to broader social movements.
The models of planned social change are strategies based on
different understandings of the underlying roots of social problems.
Converging with the models of planned change, therefore, are explanatory or causal models of poverty and underdevelopment. Charles
Valentine contrasts two models used by social scientists to explain
the persistence of poverty in advanced industrial societies. One is
a subculture of poverty model, which he terms the "Self-perpetuating
Subsociety with a Defective, Unhealthy Subculture;" the other is an
internal colonialism model, which he terms the "Externally Oppressed
Subsociety with an Imposed, Exploited Subculture." Valentine also
offers an eclectic synthesis of his two types, the "Heterogeneous
Subsociety with Variable, Adaptive Subcultures." 9 In my previous
work on the Appalachian case, I have suggested that the subculture
of poverty model (as exemplified by Jack Weller's Yesterday's
People) and the internal colonialism model (as developed by Helen
Lewis and associates) need to be supplemented by a regional development model which rationalizes those scientific, technical, and professional approaches of such organizations as the Appalachian
Regional Commission.1 0 Such a model might be termed, in Valentine's
vocabulary, as an Heterogeneous Subsociety with Inadequate Resources
and Adaptive Elites. The relationship of these causal models of
poverty to Habermas' framework and models of planned social change
(using Chin and Benne as the most general presentation) is outlined
in Table II.
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TABLE II
MODELS OF PLANNED SOCIAL CHANGE RELATED TO EXPLANATORY
MODELS OF POVERTY AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT

Habermas (1965)
Medium (and Type of Science)
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Technique
(empiricalanalytic)

Domination
(critical)
------------------

----------------------

-----------
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-a--------------------
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1976)

in a study of poverty in the non-metropolitan South, George
Thomas identifies two additional causal explanations of poverty,
the genetic and the scarce resource models.
In practical terms,
both are non-social, representing the extremes of a continuum from
the sub-individual to the ecological. The genetic explanation
asserts that poverty is biologically rooted in inferior genetic
traits. The scarcity thesis holds that resources are inadequate to
provide affluence or abundance for all, at least in this historical
period, and that poverty for some is an unavoidable outcome. Both
of these explanations place the sources of poverty beyond human
intervention in the short run. Certainly neither is supported by
enough evidence to be taken seriously for the advanced industrial
countries, and the scarce resource
thesis needs to be carefully
11
qualified even on a world scale.
It is tempting to characterize the subculture of poverty,
regional development, and internal colonialism models as, respectively,
conservative, liberal, and radical models of barriers to social change.
While this would contain a substantial amount of truth, the description would be misleading in one respect. The underlying metastrategies are not, strictly speaking, mutually exclusive alternatives.
All societies have to be concerned with each of the three modes of
interaction, technique, and domination. Habermas' framework provides a basis for viewing cultural and communicative adaptation,
technical planning, and redistribution of power as potentially complementary aspects of social development.
To assert the possibility of complementarity is not to deny
that the models have ideological uses. The subculture of poverty
model is well known for its conservative bias, but it is only one
Ax
le within a broader range of explanations rooted in the tradition of cultural idealism. Affirmative cultural approaches are the
obverse side of the coin from the pejorative tradition. Although
they come to opposite conclusions about the virtues of the traditional subculture, they are contending on the same turf. 1 2 The
regional development model, and its professional-technical strategy
for change, can be seen from Habermas' perspective as resting within
the contemporary technocratic image and ideology of science. As
John Friedmann points out, the regionalism movement of the 1930s, as
personified by Howard Odum and others, was rooted in cultural
idealism. The new regionalism of the 1960s, as represented by the
Appalachian Regional Commission, discarded this grounding in favor
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of the technical reason of neoclassical economic theory. 1 3 In a
period of extensive public disillusionment with the role of private
business in our society, the prestige of the professional planner
with technical expertise has been substantially enhanced.
As
Habermas notes, "technology and science themselves in the form of
a common positivistic way of thinking, articulated as technocratic
consciousness, began to take the role of a substitute ideology for
the demolished bourgeois ideologies. "1 4 In the words of Trent
Schroyer, "Contemporary science and technology have become a new form
of legitimating power and privilege . . . . the scientific image of
science has become the dominant legitimating system of advanced
industrial society." 1 5 Without a broader critique of power and
domination, the regional development and rational-empirical models
serve as a rationalization of existing structures of privilege.
This synthetic framework helps explain why writers widely
considered to be champions of a certain development model or change
strategy also draw on other models.
To take an example from the
Appalachian case, Harry Caudill is best known for his description
of the Cumberland Plateau as an example of colonialism, but in
Night Comes to the Cumberlands he also paints a pejorative picture
of the subculture of the eastern Kentucky poor.
In one essay
Caudill appears to embrace many aspects of the regional development
model while in a recent work he has reemphasized a genetic explanation. 1 6
From the other side, Weller is best known for his subculture of poverty characterization in Yesterday's People, yet he
recently described Appalachia as "America's mineral colony."17 Such
examples can be viewed as cases of inconsistency, confusion, or
conversion. They can also be seen, at least in part, as attempts
to grapple with the complexity of analyzing the problems of
Appalachian development.
To suggest that a dialectic of mutual interaction takes place
among the modes of culture, technique, and power is to argue for a
more sophisticated model of the origins and perpetuation of inequality
in advanced industrial societies, and a correspondingly elaborate
strategy for planned social change. In a recent work Habermas
suggests a model for the analysis of advanced capitalist societies
which focuses on the structure of the economy, the role of the
state, the system of legitimation, and class structures. 1 8 I have
mentioned some of the issues raised by the model for the Appalachian
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case in my earlier discussion. The conspicuous empty space in
Table II suggests we are missing a strategy of planned social
change which would follow from an elaborated analysis of advanced
industrial capitalism. Such a successful democratic socialist
strategy is yet to be developed by the Left in North America and
Western Europe. Efforts to attack the persistent problems of
poverty, inequality, and privilege in advanced capitalism will
remain partial and fragmentary until a strategy is devised
adequate to the challenge of simultaneous activity in the realms
of culture, technique, and domination.
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MAINTAINING GOALS IN A MUTUAL-BENEFIT ASSOCIATION*
BY JAMES R. HUDSON
THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY - CAPITOL CAMPUS

ABSTRACT

Mutual benefit associations have been frequently found to confront two major problems: membership apathy and oligarchical control.
The organization presented in this paper solved those two problems in
unique ways. First professionals employed by the organization were
kept in subordinant roles when key policy decisions were made by the
lay board. Secondly, the organizational structure did not match the
reward structure, i.e., salaries of supervisors were often lower than
those of the professional staff. Finally, the organization operated

on the principle that each of its programs should be taken over by
other organizations and were successful frequently enough with this

policy that no program became imbedded within the organization so no
one group could gain hegemony.

*The author wishes to thank the members of the Community Psychology

Program at The Pennsylvania State University, Capitol Campus, for
their help and encouragement in this research. In particular
Professors Robert W. Colman, James L. Knestrick and Duane E.
Shuttlesworth were most generous with their time. In addition
Professor Anne Mooney Hudson made a number of suggestions that,

hopefully, increased the clarity of this paper. The reviewer for
this journal is also thanked for some generous assistance.
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The organization studied here is a local chapter of a national
voluntary association for the benefit of retarded children. Beginning in the early 1950's parents of retarded children were drawn
together for the purposes of providing, through mutual assistance
services for their children not available through other community
agencies. 1 Initially, these parents were concerned with establishing schools. As the association grew, additional activities by
various chapters encompassed a wide range of services for retarded
children. Today the association has local, state, and national
offices that coordinate activities. It is a federated structure,
organized at the local level with a high degree of autonomy for the
local chapters. This study is concerned with the operations of one
chapter. The conclusions drawn about this chapter are not necessarily applicable to other units of the association. A broader comparative analysis would offer some interesting tests of the findings
reported here.
Although there is no uniformity in the use of terms such as
complex organization, formal organization, and bureaucracy, sufficient consensus exists to permit examination of the phenomenon
without elaborate explanations. There has been attempts to differentiate among types of organizations, but there is no commonly
accepted typology. The selection of any one over another depends
upon the problem to be considered. The typology developed by Blau
and Scott offers the best orientation to the organization under
study here. 2 They divide formal organizations into four types of
focusing upon the prime beneficiary.
(1) 'mutual benefit associations,' where the prime
beneficiary is the membership;
(2) 'business concerns,' where the owners are the
prime beneficiary;
(3) 'service organizations,' where the client group
is the prime beneficiary; and
(4) 'commonweal organizations,' where the prime
beneficiary ia the public-at-large 3
The organization examined in this paper fits their description
of a mutual-benefit association. In the first place, individuals
who share a common problem, retarded offspring, founded the association with the avowed purpose of obtaining help for their specific
needs, even though they cast their problem in a broader societal
framework. Secondly, ultimate authority rests with the members,
each of whom had equal rights within the organization, including
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eligibility for elected and appointed office.
Mutual-benefit associations are confronted "with two main
problems: membership apathy and oligarchical control. '4 Apathy
is a problem insofar as the members, as the major beneficiaries,
need to contribute their energies so that the organization can perform its tasks. Withdrawal of members from active participation
jeopardizes the effectiveness of the organization. At the same
time an effective organization must have some internal division
of labor. This involves the delegation of authority and establishment of differential positions within the organization.
It is the purpose here to demonstrate how one organization
handles these problems. The major emphasis will be on the internal
delegation of authority and the problem of oligarchical control as
posed by the creation of a hired staff. The question of apathy will
be treated only as it pertains to that control.
The association chapter we studied began with a small group of
parents who wanted to establish a school for their retarded children.
From this rather modest beginning, the chapter has grown into an
organization that has about 1500 members and employes approximately
thirty full-time workers with an annual budget of over $300,000.
It
runs a state-accredited school, a sheltered workshop, and various
recreation programs for both children and adults.
Three organizational divisions are distinguishable.
Standing
in the middle is a membership composed primarily of parents of retarded children. From this membership the various offices of the
chapter are filled, e.g., the board of directors, operating committees, representatives to state and national conventions. Another
dividion is the Association-Aides, volunteers who are organized into
groups throughout the city and are responsible to the board of
directors. For the most part the aides do not have retarded children
and serve primarily as fund raisers and dispensers of information.
Association-Aide chapters, while linked together in a loose federation, mostly operate independently of the association. While dedicated to the goals of the organization, the Association-Aides emphasize social events.
The last division, and the one that will concern us in detail, is the paid staff, including administrators,
psychologists, social workers, and teachers, these employees, all
appointed by the board, man the administrative offices on a day-today basis and operate the school and sheltered workshop.
II
The growth of bureaucratic structures within an organization
can increase its rationality and efficiency, it can also lead to
tensions and strains generated by the requirements of bureaucracy
which run counter to the goals of the organization.
"Running an
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organization, as a specialized and essential activity, generates
problems which have no necessary (and often opposed) relationship
to the professed or 'original' goals of the organization." 5 The
internal problems and their solutions cause the organization to
alter its activities. "Then, since these activities come to consume
an increasing proportion of the time and thoughts of the participants, they are - from the point of view of actual behavior '6
substituted for the professed goals."
These observations on organizational behavior raise the question
of how the organization studied has been affected by the development
within its structure of a service and administrative division staffed
by professionals and organized bureaucratically. There is an organizational chart with neat lines connecting the various branches of the
services: authority and decision-making flow along these lines. The
operations are routinized, rules exist, and attention is paid to
these rules. Technically competent persons fill the organizational
slots and perform their duties with some autonomy. Teachers, social
workers, psychologists, administrators, and secretaries are chosen
on the basis of skill. The services are operated in accordance with
policies that preclude preferential treatment to any portion of the
client population.
The association shows certain distinctive features in its
structure that limited the influence of the service division and in
turn helped maintain the goals of the organization as originally
conceived. We shall begin with two major characteristics of the
organization as a whole and then report several characteristics of
the service and administrative division that will help explain how
this particular mutual-benefit association has been able to pursue
its initial goals. In the last section we will draw some conclusions
about this organization that might have application to other organizations and point to some problems for future research.
III
One key to this association appears to be a balance between the
use of professionals and continued parental involvement. The members
are aware of the need for systematic organization procedures, the
benefits of bureaucratic efficiency, and the strategy of using
skilled personnel in agency's services, yet they are unwilling to
delegate authority on certain issues to the paid staff. One illustration: to get state financial support for their school, it is
necessary to be accreditated, which requires the employment of
certified teachers. These teachers, however, do not have control
over school admissions and other relevant decisions in the operation
of the school.
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The relationship between parents and professionals was particularly strained early in the organization's life.
As it was reported
to us, many professionals told parents of retarded children to forget
them, to institutionalize them, to get them out of the family so
their presence would not adversely affect the rest of the household.
The parents who became active in the association believed something
more could be done for their children.
The lack of sympathy these
parents found among doctors, psychologist and social workers prompted
some of them to reject whatever assistance was available, since the
7
assistance was regarded by the parents as too negative.
The association got underway without professional assistance and
prides itself on its independence from professionals. It organized
a school, developed fund-raising activities, began education pro8
grams in the community-all without employing a professional staff.
Not that this policy did not incur some animosity with other agencies,
but this has served only to reinforce their attitudes toward professionals. 9 The parents discovered through experience that they could
create an effective organization despite their lack of professional
training. Their experience re-enforced their original attitudes to
the point where the parents are now unwilling to move aside to let
the professionals run the organization. They realized that even without professional assistance programs can be developed to foster their

goals.
The services the agency provides are now professionally staffed
and the membership is justly proud of these services. Although the
initial
hostility to professionals has continued to some extent
throughout the history of the association the parents have evolved
a cooperative relationship with their professional staff.
As long
as the professionals are willing to accept membership hegemony in
most areas, they are welcome in the organization.
The function of the service division has been a major concern
for the association since its
inception. When the original school
was organized, the first
and most obvious question was which children
were to receive the services.
Some fair admissions mechanism had to
be worked out, since members had more eligible children than could
be accommodated in the proposed school. Very early in the minutes
of the board "the question was raised by one of our members if we
couldn't get a school together for our children.
He felt that the
need is immediate, and it is hard to see ten years of probably waiting, for by that time his child-and our children-will be past the
age of school."1 0 On the other hand, the first president stated:
"I have tried to stress at all meetings that we can never afford to
take a selfish view of our problem.
Our appeal to the public has
been on the basis of the retarded child as a 'forgotten child'...
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We must all be united and single-minded in our goal to advance the
welfare of all retarded children." The issue, in short, was whether
the services were for children of chapter members or for any child
who was retarded.
Although the issue is still very much alive, the chapter has
maintained its services on a space-available basis rather than
restricting them to children of members. This policy decision was
based on several considerations. In the first place the chapter
realized that its potential resources could never cope with the
needs of all the retarded children in the city--over 20,000 children
altogether. The only viable alternative was to find a place for
these children in existing community services, to modify these services if necessary so that any retarded child could be cared for.
The members realized, too, that operating only for their
children had other consequences. If the chapter limited access to
its services, it would not be able to carry effective education and
fund-raising campaigns to the larger community. To secure general
public support required a less exclusive admission policy. Finally,
the chapter members are concerned with retardation as it affects all
children, and they are willing to be the spearhead in efforts to gain
support and understanding in the wider community.
This chapter, as well as the state and national association, has
incorporated this attitude into its major goal of "procuring, not
providing, services." Under this banner the association has developed its policy of opening up other community agencies to handicapped children. It operates on the basic assumption that, while
handicapped children have special problems, they should not be excluded from receiving benefits and services of community institutions.
The association argues that these children can be helped and help
should come from the community as a whole. Exclusion in the past
from community institutions has been the result of misunderstanding,
stupidity, and prejudice. That situation is intolerable and must
be rectified.
The policy of making services available to anyone who applied
regardless of membership status was not readily accepted by all
members. The minutes contain continuous reference to the struggle.
Five years after the school was founded we note the following in
the minutes: "Mr. Abbott brought up the fact about parents who are
not paying full tuition, not being active in our organization,
whether these children should be given preference for admission. It
was decided not to show any favoritism." Still five years later we
find the same debate. "It is the opinion of the Executive Committee
that the Association policy should make membership mandatory for
parents or guardians of all" who receive association-sponsored ser-
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vices.
Before being passed, the motion was amended so that any
individual unable to afford the membership fee would be granted a
"special membership."
In practice, however, eligibility for services is not dependent on any kind of membership.
Not only has the association refused to be exclusive in its
admission policies, it has also guarded against pressures from supporting agencies. For example, a private charity that had supported
the agency for several years requested preferential treatment for two
children it wished to sponsor.
"After much discussion, it was moved
by Mr. Abbott that we adhere strictly to our Intake Policy without
any thought of change or favoritism." The private charity innediately
suspended its support.
Some members have also withdrawn when they found out that they
were not necessarily going to get association services just because
they were members. Yet the organization has not been faced with
dissolution on this account.
The receipt of services as a motivation for membership may have been an initial
impetus for some, and
the loss or non-preferential treatment may have been a reason for
withdrawing. But the organization has continued nevertheless to
grow without showing favoritism. In addition, those who organized
the association or provide services for their children have, in
large part, remained active in the agency even after their children
were no longer eligible for the services. The organization therefore
receives support from parents who realize that they may not directly
benefit from the services the agency provides. While Katz reported
a decline in parental interest with "increasing bureaucratization
and professionalization," the decline of interest of parents in the
retarded children's association he studied was much less than the
other self-help agencies.ll
IV
We have referred in the foregoing discussion to the association's primary goal of procuring services for retarded children.
We have shown, nonetheless, that the association actually provides
a wide range of services and a great deal of effort is expended to
raise funds for this major budget item.
The services, moreover,
are operated through a bureaucracy.
But the association regards provision of services as a temporary measure until they are offered elsewhere. Their services are
seen more as demonstration project or pilot programs rather than
as permanent activities. As an educational technique, the demonstration project serves to call attention to the possibility that
retarded children can be helped. On the one hand, the association
thus helps parents of retarded children to realize that their
children can learn.
The association has found many parents poorly
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informed about retardation itself. On the other hand, the demonstration projects have successfully proved to the rest of the lay
and professional community that retarded children are capable of
being trained. The association has shown that even with limited
resources something can be accomplished.
As an organizational strategy, the demonstration projects
provide a fulcrum for the association to pry open other agencies
in the community to accept these children. The demonstration
projects are developed with the goal of getting some other agency
to adopt them. The association has decided what these children
need and seek to have these needs met. It has concluded that
others have failed to assme responsibility in this area, among
other reasons, because of disbelief that anything can be done for
retarded children. The strategy, as the executive director describes it, proceeds as follows: "While we are looking for a place
to get it (a service) filled, we show first it can be done by our
pilot program. So we have a selling point-we can go and we can
say to these people:
'Look, we've been doing this--we know it can
be done."'
The strategy stands on two legs. One is the success of the
agency in providing services that really work. If the agency were
unable to start a service that it believes should be a community
responsibility, it could not easily persude others to take over.
"By starting a school, by starting classes, by starting workshops,
by showing that if you took the time, by believing that everyone
has some potential and that if properly trained, if given the
opportunity to develop that potential, they would." In this way
the agency seeks to prove its claim for services. This is the
first leg of the strategy.
The second is even more critical for the argument we are presenting. The association, to maintain its major objective, must
be ready to relinquish a given service when another community
agency agrees to take responsibility. Unless the association does
relinquish services, we would have to conclude that the bureaucratic segment of the association has become entrenched.
The association has, indeed, dropped services and modified
others, as other agencies have assumed the task. When the association was organized, for example, no public school facilities were
available for retarded children. The original association school
provided a program for the least retarded children who were eight
years of age or older. The success of this program was the basis
for the association's case to the city's board of education that
the school system could offer classes for these children. The
school system did begin to open classes for the older retarded
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children, and the association immediately cut out its services to
them. It proceeded to launch a new program for younger and more
severely limited children and again to obtain from the school
system more classes. Its current program centers on even younger
children and shows signs of being as effective as the others.
The association's recreation program followed a similar
pattern. Begun as a demonstration project, the recreation program
received recognition from other agencies who were willing to cooperate with the association. The association gladly shared responsibility and credit with the cooperating agencies for several years,
constantly shifting more and more of the program onto the shoulders
of the other agencies, until it was able to withdraw altogether. In
the process of the association's recreation director, a paid staff
member with eight years of service, was let go when his assistance
was no longer required.
The strategy of relinquishing implies a terminal point in the
organization's demonstration and services activity. Procurement of
an ever-increasing number of services outside the agency means that
eventually all services will be available elsewhere, and one important function of the agency will disappear.
When and if no more
demonstration projects are needed, when these handicapped children
are adequately serviced in the community, some of the active members
feel the agency can be dissolved.
In the words of one: "When you've
accomplished your purpose, you fold your tent and leave. You leave,
that's all. You've done it--you've done your job. You've succeeded.
Then retire."
Whether or not this will occur remains to be seen. In discussing the possibility of dissolution the executive director said,
"Why should we think that we're so much better than other agencies.
Look at polio, the polio foundation should be out of business.
There is no more polio. So what do they do? They begin to look
around for another cause. But there are people there that have
vested interests." The situation in this agency is somewhat different.
The local chapters are far more important to the retarded
children's organization than are the local chapters in the National
12
Foundation.
The association may well continue beyond its service-providing
period. What will replace the service activity? Probably an increase in its watchdog function. The parents of the retarded will
no longer be as concerned with getting the services as they will be
in protecting and improving what they have obtained.
Most of the
present formal bureaucratic staff, however, will no longer be needed
and its probable demise is of major importance for this analysis.
We will return to this point. Let us now consider other aspects of
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the association that inhibit the paid bureaucracy from dominating
the agency.
V
Career lines are promotional paths with known mobility expectations, characteristic of bureaucratic structure. It has been noted
that a bureaucratic hierarchy is a "congealed model of the career
pattern. It provides a set of steps through which the individual
may advance, a promotional horizon for motivation of those lower
downs."'1 3 An employee is able to assess his/her position; he/she
knows who is above him/her and who is below him/her in the organization. He/she expects that growth in experience, continuous and
faithful service, will be rewarded by movement upward within the
organization.
The association in question, however, does not encourage the
development of careers. In the first place it does not offer elaborate fringe benefits. Its pay scale is low in comparison to other
agencies, and the security of tenure is not available. The employment posture of the association was announced by the executive
director: "If they want security, let them get a civil service job."
Such a policy does not lead to long-term employment. Examination of the payroll records of the agency for the last ten years
indicated the length of service of the professional staff. Roughly
speaking, the mean was just over three years and the median just
over two years. The high turnover means little career development
among professional staff occurs within the agency.
Careers within the agency are otherwise limited by distribution
of authority and rewards within bureaucracy. Authority follows the
hierarchical structure; the reward system does not. The executive
director, for example, holds the highest administrative position in
the association, but receives a lower salary than the director of
the workshop and school. Other inconsistencies between rank and
salary were also found in the pay records. Whether or not this
practice is a consciously executed policy, it eliminates a certain
amount of striving for promotion. The association, in general,
ignores the detrimental efforts that its reward system can have on
employee morale. Geared as it is to programs that are highly flexible and dispensible, it treats all such problems as temporary.
This policy no doubt contributes to the high staff turnover, but it
does not apparently limit the organization's effectiveness in
accomplishing its goals.
Characteristically, the association has failed to build into
its bureaucracy any definite lines of succession. For example, the
executive director has an assistant immediately adjacent to his/her
position. The Personnel Committee of the Board of Directors re-
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viewed this position and carefully considered the title. The title
of Assistant Director was rejected in favor of Administrative
Assistant because "implicit in the title Assistant Director is that
when the executive director moves out.. .logically he should move in."
And this, it was decided, did not apply. The elimination of clear
lines of succession within the organization, and disparities between
rank and compensation reduce the tendency toward career development
and bureaucratic entrenchment in the association.
The association also utilizes professionals in its organizational
slots, another element that may help retard the development of an
entrenched bureaucracy. As has been argued a "major factor affecting
degree of bureaucracy in the agency is the proportion of personnel
that is strongly committed to a profession." 14 The presence of professionals in a bureaucracy can increase or decrease bureaucratization, but "that in the balance the reduction effect may be stronger."
The reasoning on this point is that a professional has a code of
ethics developed outside the bureaucratic structure and adherence
to this code can have unbureaucratic results. The professional role
and the bureaucratic role may be in conflict.1 5
Blau and Scott conclude with a slightly different emphasis
that professionals will be less loyal to a bureaucracy than other
staff personnel when the opportunities for professional advancement
are more readily found outside the bureaucracy than within it. 1 6 It
has also been suggested that professional career lines may cut across
agencies. Many a professional moves through a series of employers
as he/she advances in his/her career.
The absence of orderly careers, a factor whose presence is often
cited as increasing rigidity and efficiency, contributes to the
association's ability to maintain its primary goals. As long as
staff positions are not filled by the sane person for any duration
of time, it is impossible to build vested interests in the position.
VI
We have shown how bureaucratic structures function in meeting
internal organizational demands. These functions can have consequences that impinge upon stated organizational goals. The literature suggests that organizations, while created for "specific ends"
or "to attain specific goals," may encounter difficulties because
of conditions that obtain in actual operations. In particular, when
a broad membership delegates authority to a corps of specialists,
these specialists may act in ways detrimental to the fundamental
purpose of the organization as conceived by its members.
There is one feature of the association for retarded children
that distinguishes it from other organizations of the same type,
namely, the continued dedication of members to the organization.
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Barber, reporting on apathy in voluntary associations, argues that
participation in such organizations has a lower priority than family
and job obligations in our society. 1 7 The stigma of having a retarded
child continues, however, even after some services become available.
This helps weld the parents (or members) together; moreover, it keeps
them active in the association. We would hypothesize a decrease in
intensive participation by these parents if they believed their children, and they themselves, were more accepted in the society at large.
An organization founded by volunteers in which the volunteers
continue to play an active role is less likely to lose its major
focus than an organization where the authority for operations is
delegated to a paid staff. As long as the paid staff is kept subordinate to the volunteers, they cannot take over critical decisionmaking that reduces the members' control.

The decision of the members not to limit access to the services
to only their children diminished the possibility the membership
would develop a vested interest in providing services rather than
procuring them for all retarded children from the community at large.

The association by this action protected itself from internal cooptation. The point is, of course, that it did, in fact give up certain
services when other community agencies began to provide services the

association has been providing.
The relinquishing mechanism provided the way in which the organization divested itself of services. The relationship between the
services and the association is a relationship Gouldner identifies
as asymmetrical. He argues that most organizational analysis employs
the concept of interdependence among parts. Granting interdependence,
he does not assume symmetry will also be present. Rather "there
are varying degrees of interdependence which may be postulated to
exist among parts of the system." 18 Parts of a system may be removed from the system without jeopardizing the system. "Functional
autonomy directs attention to the possibility that any part may have
little, as well as great, need for another, and that the mutual need
of parts need not be symmetrical."'1 9 It is precisely this situation
that exists in the organization we studied. The services are much
more dependent upon the association than the association upon the
services. Any given service has a strategic value to the organization, but it can be replaced by another or none at all. Initially,
the services had far more importance to the members than they came
to have as the association became successful in getting services
provided elsewhere.
Members of the service staff were expendable. This policy
could be detrimental to further recruitment of a professional staff
except the association does not project operating services into an
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undetermined future. The personnel policies in fact reenforce its
public stance of procuring rather than providing services.
If the
association were more concerned with building a permanent staff and
services, it could be accused of abandoning its primary goal. Besides, once it has been successful in obtaining particular services
elsewhere, it need not worry about staffing these services again.
The relinquishing of services also precluded career advancement
and the development of some vested interests. The association does
not hide its policy, so employees are well appraised that "success"
means termination of employment. The employment of professionals
further facilitates the ability to relinquish services.
The professional as an employee is attuned to job mobility. He/she has a
transferable skill that has a fairly broad market.
Movement from
agency is not detrimental to his/her career interests and may even
facilitate them. A professional is less enamoured with bureaucracy,
so the lack of a bureaucratic work setting is not necessarily deleterious to his/her performance.
Finally, once the agency successfully
relinquished one service, the probability of future relinquishing
increased. The process became institutionalized.
The mutual-benefit association, as it becomes established and
seeks to implement programs and policies, needs a more formal structure.
But-it need not necessarily follow that the paid functionaries come to dominate the organization through processes commonly
found in such organizations.
The case study presented here showed
how hegemony over the paid staff can be maintained. We discovered
that there were two bureaucratic structures operating; one composed
of the parents and one composed of paid personnel. The bureaucratic
structure staffed by parents of retarded children had not delegated
sufficient authority to the other to cause it to lose substantial
power within the organization.
We found that the parents were able to use the administrative
and service division for specific purposes.
The relationship between the parents and the administrative and service division was
asymmetrical making the former less dependent upon the latter than
vice versa. The association has also limited the development of
careers. For example, the reward system and authority system were
not parallel, making promotions less desirable. Employing potentially mobile professionals also contributed to lowering vested
interests in the job. Finally, the willingness to slough off a
given service and its staff keep important decision-making in the
hands of the members.
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Footnotes
1. Katz calls this type of association a self-help agency. He
states that the major function of a self-help agency is "what
might be termed mutual assistance" in which "persons of the
same kind of helplessness and need have a tendency to associate with and to help others." Alfred H. Katz, Parents of the
Handicapped (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1971),
pp. 13-14. Another name for this type of organization, democratic association, is offered in Bernard Barber, "Participation and Mass Apathy in Associations," Studies in Leadership,
ed. Alvin W. Gouldner (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960),
pp. 477-504.
2. See Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott, Formal Organizations:
A Comparative Approach (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing
Company, 1962), pp. 40-45. They define formal organizations
where "collective effort is explicitly organized for special
ends."
p. 223. See also Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative
Analysis of Complex Organizations (New York: The Free Press
of Glencoe, 1961).
3. Ibid., P. 43.
4. Ibid., p. 45.
5. Philip Selznick, "An Approach to a Theory of Bureaucracy,"
American Sociological Review, VIII (February, 1943), p. 48.
6. Ibid.,The literature on the dysfunctions of bureaucracies is
quite rich and varied. See, for example, Seymour Martin Lipset,
"Bureaucracy and Social Change," and Robert K. Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality," in Robert K. Merton, ed.,
et. al., Reader in Bureaucracy, (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free
Press, 1962).
7. Katz notes in his study of four parent-organized self-help
agencies that the impetus for organizing was the perception
on the part of the parents of "inadequate medical knowledge,
insufficient interest and attention by professionals, lack
of treatment facilities and research programs." A similar
situation existed prior to the foundation of the agency studied.
Katz, op. cit., p. 111.
8. Parents taught the first school classes.
9. Katz reports that self-help agencies often encountered difficulties because of a "lack of knowledge or indifference of
their staff members to the more highly 'professionalized' outlook characteristics of the trained staff of other community
agencies." Katz, op. cit., p. 99.
10. Italics added.
11. Katz, op. cit., pp. 99 and 103.
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13.

14.
15.

16.
17.
18.

19.

There is a clear cut separation of activities in the National
Foundation. Local chapters are prohibited from sponsoring
research for example. This division of labor does not exist
in the retarded children's association. See David L. Sills,
The Volunteers: Means and Ends in a National Organization
(Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1957), pp. 72-75.
Harold W. Wilensky and Charles N. LeBeaux, Industrial Society
and Social Welfare (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1958),
p. 236.
Ibid., p. 245.
The conflict between a professional code of ethics and bureaucratic structure is reported by March G. Field, "Structured
Strain in the Role of the Soviet Physician," American Journal
of Sociology, LVIII (1952-1953), pp. 493-500.
Blau and Scott, op. cit., p. 71.
Barber, op. cit., p. 486.
Alvin W. Gouldner, "Reciprocity and Autonomy in Functional
Theory," Symposium or Sociological Theory, ed. Llewellyn Gross
(Evanston: Row, Petersen and Company, 1959), p. 254.
Ibid.
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LIVING AND ACTING IN AN ALTERED BODY: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION OF
AMPUTATION
Mary Jo Deegan,

University of Nebraska--Lincoln
Abstract

Adults with recent amputations are often perceived as suffering
from post-operative depression and phantom limbs. These states are
frequently seen as failures in "adjustment" since there are often few
physiological involvements which curtail daily functioning. This perspective is seen as compatible with major American values of pragmatism,
individualism, and a mechanistic medical model. We suggest here that
problems in daily living and the phantom limb are not "mental" aberrations but rather reflections of a radically altered lived experience.
The performance of the actor is significantly changed and can be discussed as a function of changed experience, and style. This persppctivedraws upon the work of phenomenology and dramaturgy and suggests a
changed philosophical approach in physical rehabilitation. A brief
application of the model is also presented.
Most of the literature written on the behavior of amputees is psychological in orientation. For example, early reactions to the amputation by a group of amputees were categorized by Simon and Albronda
(1967) as including disbelief, stunned feelings, fear and panic, anger,
grief, relief, guilt, and revulsion. Another study, determining
amputees' readiness to accept the stresses of prosthetic restoration,
categorized personality types such as the undisciplined, the emotional
neurotics, the blamers, the fearful, and the isolated and depressed
hypochondriacs (Weiss, 1960).
Levin (1961) found that denial and phantom
limb are associated manifestations of amputation rather than cause and
effect.
This explanation of behavior occurring after an amputation supports
three major American values and models for behavior: pragmatism, individualism and the medical model.
These social constructions are examined
here and alternate models (phenomenology and dramaturgy) for explaining
the behavior of amputees are suggested.
Amputation:

THe Existing Literature and View

In
Amputations occur with the severing of one or more body parts.
this study, amputations of the limbs are the focus of interest because
they comprise the major part of the literature, and they exhibit patterns
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and problems similar to those occurring with amputations of other body
parts, such as the breast and nose.
Amputations are primarily found in the adult as a result of vascular
disease, trauma, or malignancy. The distribution of amputations is often
further stratified by age. Vascular disease is responsible for a large
A
number of amputations in the geriatric population. (Aitken, 1961.)
disproportionate number of young people are involved in accidents causing amputations, and malignant tumors affect all ages.
One of the major post-operative problems associated with amputations
is the phantom limb and its accompanying pain. The persistence of "feeling" in the amputated limb has been a frequently encountered difficulty,
affecting recovery and prosthesis fitting. One study of over 7,000
amputees treated during a twelve year period found that all amputees at
one time or another suffer some phantom pain, although not all have persistent stump pain (Canty and Bleck, 1958). Many theories of its origin,
cause and elimination have been put forth: local stump irritation (Canty

and Bieck, 1958), a psycho-physiological entity (Frederiks, 1963), and
psychopathology (Frazier, 1966). Problems associated with adjusting to
the amputation have also been discussed as a function of changes in body
image (Saxvik, 1965; Fischer and Cleveland, 1968).
Improvements in surgery and the development of more "life-like" 1 and
flexible prostheses have characterized the treatment of amputations.
The potential for improved techniques in replacing human parts and functions is even greater. Murphy (1965) cites some of the challenges:
increasing knowledge in biology, medicine, surgery, and engineering;
"tissue-friendly" materials; infection resistent passage of inert material
through the skin; reliability; minimum bulk; and developing the appropriate size and appearance.
Reading this medical literature, one finds the concept of a "mechanistic" medical model radically enacted. (See a discussion of the model
in Freidson, 1975; Szasz, 1974; Scheff, 1966; Dreitzel, 1971). Body parts
are discussed without reference to "being'. Potential bodily responses
such as pain or infection are "problems of management."
When the human is reintroduced he is discussed in terms of his
"acceptance" or lack of acceptance of the amputation. As mentioned above,
this state is determined by the individual's "psychological" response.
He is measured and evaluated in terms of his ego strength, adaptability,
and qualities of honor, courage and dignity. Succinctly, he must be a
"strong individual."
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This individualized interpretation is supported by the ubiquitous
advice to learn to "cope" with one's handicap (Fink, 1967; Kerr-Cohn,

1961; Jones, 1972). This emphasis on individualism permeates our society
(Parsons, 1951; Williams, 1960) and our myths (Cawalti, 1974).
Rehabilitation is oriented towards emphasizing the remaining skills
and functioning (Rabinowitz and Mitsos, 1964; Safilious-Rothschild, 1970).
It is this emphasis on functioning which so aptly combines many threa s
of American culture: pragmatism, individualism and the medical model.1
Pragmatism is one of the few unique American philosophies (Konvitz
and Kennedy, 1960).
It combines an optimistic view of man and science:
science can be usefully applied to improve the situation of mankind. It
is a philosophy that underlies physical rehabilitation.
Functioning in daily life is the major goal of rehabilitation. This
is operationally defined as the ability to work and maintain self-care.
These goals are operative for all of the occupations associated with rehabilitation; the physicians and specialists, the nurse and the therapists: occupational, physical, speech, vocational and recreational. When
the patient is technically able to function and does not do so, or does
so poorly, then the "client" is referred to a psychologically oriented
"counselor" (e.g. psychologist, social worker or psychiatrist). This
pattern of action is particularly important for the amputee. Many, if
not most, amputees are capable of functioning in a manner similar to that
prior to the amputation.
An investigation into the effect of amputation upon employment
in the record of 4,000 users that were scrutinized showed that,
of those amputated above the knee, 65 percent returned to the
same or similar work, 13.5 percent became financially better off,
16.5 percent obtained less renumeration, and 5 percent were unemployed or under training at time of check (Kelham, 1958:335).
A similar but slightly lower rate of employment is found with amputations
of the upper limbs (Kelham, 1958). Usually physiological, sexual functions,
mental awareness, speech and other "biological" capacities are "unaffected." Changes in behaviors associated with these life skills are considered, therefore, to be changes in one's"mental" attitude.
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Phenomenology and Dramaturgy
The above model is obviously built upon a Cartesian dualism between
mind and body (see Yankelovich and Barrett for an extensive discussion
of the paradigm and its use in ego psychology, 1970).
It is this
arbitrary division which is attacked and resolved by phenomenology. The
emphasis is on lived experience, and, most importantly for us, on the

lived body (see Wild, 1964; Strauss, 1964, 1966; Zaner, 1964, 1965;
Merleau-Ponty, 1963; De Waelhens, 1967). The experience of the world
is enacted through and in one's body. The changes wrought by an
amputation, therefore, are immediately interpreted as a function of a
hew lived experience. With phenomenology, daily, physiological functioning is not the major criterion for analyzing the effect of the amputation.
The multiple changes initiated in one's experience can be further
articulated using a dramaturgical approach to "map out: alterations in
one's life--world (Schutz, 1962; Deegan and Stein,
1977).
Before proceeding further in this discussion, it is necessary to
define what is meant by a dramaturgical approach. This is a perspective where man is an actor with parts to play on the stage of life. He
has roles, scenes, settings and scripts to order the action. Most importantly for the amputee, he has a performance to enact; he has a style
to fit his presentation (see Burke, 1969, 1969; Goffman, 1959, 1961, 1963;
Strauss, 1959; Stone, 1963, 1959). For the amputee, he is an actor in a
new body. The script goes on but he has entered the scene as a new
performer. The most fundamental change has occurred. The most intimate
part of the performance has changed: the body of the performer.
Here is no mere faux pas, no minor change in lines or scenes. The
amputee is not taught to end one portion of the script or action, nor is
he aided in entering a new setting. Instead, he is pushed into the same
scene, given the same lines and parts and told to "adjust".
With this metaphor we can vividly see the consequences. The amputee
must "carry on" the action while rewriting and redirecting. Simultaneously, a new style and performance must be learned. To appear awkward
on stage "spoils" the performance (Goffman suggests it may "spoil" the
identity, 1963: b), although it continues. Emphasis on the continuity
and not on the quality blinds the actor and his partners. Although the
script goes on, the performance has changed, and if the performance is
bad, the actor is blamed. A new role is then assigned: the neurotic,
the weak, the depressed. In time, the "label" (Becker, 1963) may become
permanent and, in fact, the actor has a new, negative role.
He is moved
off center-stage and relegated to a minor character.
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This scenario can obviously be altered through the recognition that
many amputees live a new performance after an amputation. Therefore,
"rehabilitation" should provide a "script" which helps in re-writing the
style of the actor and dealing with the changed experience. One of the
most unusual experiences then becomes ready to be discussed (and not
merely "treated"): the phantom limb.
The sensation of a missing part is a dramatic example of the unity
of the actor. This unity cannot be mechanically treated. The body,
the living experience, emphatically denies the "social construction of
reality" supported by the medical model.
The attempt to categorize and
label a deep human experience as one of "neurones and neuroses" is a
major factor in generating "the problem of adjustment."
The phantom limb experience points directly to questions of the self
and its embodiment: "Is part of me gone?" "Am I less me?" "Who am I if
not my body ?' The living experience of one's being in an absent part
can be seen, then, as a fundamental question of identity and self (see
Stone, 1959, 1962 for a discussion of self and appearance). To apply
these questions to a dramaturgical framework: who am I if not this actor?
the person with this performance? With the significant continuation of
functional capacities which were previously enacted in a different body,
it is "normal" to expect continued experience in an amputated part.
Major portions of the self have continued and this continued act supports
the continued expectations.
To look at the phenomenon of the phantom limb in yet another perspective, placing the experience as a primary criterion for action and
"rehabilitation" it becomes part of the total experience of an amputation
rather than an "abnormal" adjunct to the medical removal of a limb. The
medical model dictates the meaning of the experience. In phenomenology,
the experience would dictate the meaning for the theoretical interpretive
model.
Application of the Model
There is a direct need for theoretical elaborations and conceptualization of the rehabilitation process which avoid pitfalls of present models.
A step towards new working models is exemplified in this article and
several others (Deegan, 1977a, 1977b, Psathas, 1977).
Since most of the
helping professions associated with rehabilitation use psychological
models of behavior, it is consistent that a sociological model is absent
in their applied approaches. Therefore, once sociological theoretical
frameworks are developed, the application of these frameworks can be
undertaken in hospital and clinical settings, but most importantly,
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in training rehabilitation personnel.
Application of the e concepts in small groups is needed to enact
concrete performances.4 In addition, many programs or personnel may
be drawing upon the model elaborated here and a search should be made
to bring practioners and theoreticians together. One possible structured resource that has been actively engaged in social learning is rehabilitation therapy. For example, at the hospital where the author did
her dissertation research they had a program for teaching amputees
dancing skills at Arthur Murray's. Participant observation at such
sessions and interviews with the participants and teachers would provide a significant basis for constructing a more elaborate foundation
for developing and applying the model suggester here (see Deegan, 1975,

Pp. 137-78 for a discussion of socialization and rehabilitation).
A growing body of literature could be developed from these initial studies
to help others in applying this model. As a brief introduction to some
methods for doing this, a program of action is suggested here.
Group Settings
Many recent movements to change basic life orientations and belief
systems have drawn upon a self help, peer-learning model. People with
shared lived experiences can often explain the alterations in their
worlds in a more realistic manner than "experts" trained to interpret
that change. The use of group leaders is strongly suggested. Such
organizers could lend structure to a group setting composed of recent
amputees who have lived in different settings prior to their disability.
After some initial discussions and mutual observations, training sessions
could be organized around specific work and social setting problems:
for example walking, sitting, dressing, shaking hands. Criticisms and
suggestions for change could be more easily offered by people who actually share the experience, especially in such a sensitive area of
evaluation. Making this a learned, shared experience rather than an
isolating, often humiliating one, would be the goal. Films of awkward
movements could be made and used for discussions of options leading to
new methods of handling embarrassing situations, and new ways to learn
good self presentation.
Obviously, using the dramaturgy model, role scenarios could be
devised and acted out. Self-help groups would provide relatively "safe"
areas in which to experiment with actions resulting from inexperience
in coping with an altered body. Discussions of such exercises would
be keyed to role and acting concepts as well as the individual
experiences of the "actors."
Discomfort, elation, dismay and humor
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are all possible responses. Comparisons of these staged actions and
everyday actions could then be made.
After a period of work with amputees only it would be desirable to
have families and friends participate. The same model emphasizing group
experiences, social expectations, and learning behavior could then be
stressed.
It would be vital that such groups not degenerate into group
therapy sessions; i.e., locating problems primarily as a function of
personality. Since the psychological model dominates outside the
rehabilitation setting as well as within it, this would be a constant
strain at first.
Individual Learning
The group process could operate in conjunction with individual
consultations and aids. Some people might find groups intimidating
and need to search out new behavioral cuses and roles on a one-to-one
basis. The direct use of dramatic metaphors in this interaction is
suggested for the model developed in this paper. Since sociologists
are most interested in group dynamics and structure, primary emphasis
will be placed on the group environment presented above rather than on
individualized application of a shared, social process. A significant
part of the "clinical" sociology exchange would be devoted to the Integration of the individual into everyday life. Emphasis would be given
to people immediately interacting with the amputee in face-to-face
situations.
The Sociologist as an Applied Practioner
Sociologists are becoming increasingly aware of possibilities for
sociologists as providers for human services.
(See for example,
Gouldner and Miller, 1965; Street and Weinstein, 1975; Glass, 1977).
Of course, the most established model for a combination of theory and
practice (praxis) emerges from the Marxist tradition. The description
of alternative theoretical models is very recent and the combination of
these new frameworks with sociological practice is in its infancy. With
the present model, all of the physical rehabilitation training done with
the sociologist would proceed under the a priori assumption that the
"phantom limb" experience exists and that there is a need for a new
vocabulary to express the reality of and response to this experience.
Phenomenological/dramatists would then search for theoretical constructs
as well as practical methods for interpreting and acting on this assumption. More concrete paradigms for theory and practice than that offered
here would necessarily emerge from the exchange between everyday action
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and scientific research.

Conclusion
This paper has addressed itself to adults' responses to amputations.
It has shown that our view of amputations is grounded in three major
American values: individualism, pragmatism, and a mechanistic, medical
model.
We have suggested here that these social constructions of reality
(Berger and Luckmann, 1966) ignore the experience and performance of the
amputee. Instead of determining "functioning" in a mechanistic manner
measured by physiological capabilities, the concept of "functioning"
should include one's total reality experienced in a lived body. Radical
changes in one's lived body would be expected also to cause radical
changes in one's everyday life. This different reality is naturally new,
and frightening, particularly since it may hold a "stigmatized" role for
the actor. Comprehension of this reality points to new directions for
the generation of more positive "cues" and "acting lessons" as part of
physical rehabilitation.
A brief presentation of possible applications of the model was presented in order to show the changed physical rehabilitation program
which would result. These suggestions are exploratory and a more elaborate model and its application depend upon the lived experience of both
amputees and sociologists with a phenomenological/dramaturgical praxis.
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FOOTNOTES
1
Extensive bibliographies on amputations and amputees are available.
This provides an excellent, cross-lisciplinary introduction to the
literature (See Amputees, Amputations, and Artificial Limbs, 1969,1971).
2

For an analysis of the contradictions inherent in the rehabilita-

tion goals, see Deegan 1977b, 945-49.
3

Discussions of the negative consequences of a physical disability
are frequent. For an in-depth analysis of "stigma" see Goffman (1963).

4Although role playing and sociodrama appear to be similar models
to that suggested here differences between these methods for group
teaching and a dramaturgical theory needs to be established. Such a
comparison is beyond the scope of this paper, but a few examples can
be given. Dramaturgy is more than role playing. When one's personal,
sexual and financial statuses are threatened, role enactment is of vital
concern. Lived experience, not just an enactment of someone's possible
experience, is a fundamental assumption of our model. Social expectations are constraints, they are part of objective reality, but different
dramas can exist within those boundaries. The dramaturgical model
suggested here is also a factor in explaining the phantom limb which
challenges the dominant social construction of reality of this experience.
(See pp.
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Blacks in the American Criminal Justice System:
A Study of Sanctioned Deviance

Terry Jones

There must be something in the very core
of a social system which increases its
wealth without diminishing its misery, and
increases its crime even more rapidly than
its numbers.
Karl Marx
New York Daily Tribune
September 16, 3859

Almost since the beginning of Black history in America there have
been differences of opinion as to what the role of Blacks should be in
reference to the criminal justice system. In the beginning these differences centered around the issue of cooperation or resistance to the
slave system and a criminal justice system that guaranteed slavery
durante vita. Now, while the issue is no longer slavery, Blacks continue
the debate over cooperation versus resistance to the criminal justice
system. What should the role of Blacks be in reference to the criminal
justice system? Can Blacks be of greater assistance to other Blacks by
working within the system? Does working within this system imply support
for it? Is resistance to the system a viable alternative to Blacks?
Are there realistic alternatives to the present criminal justice system?
Do Blacks have a choice as to what their role is or will be in this system?
The pages that follow address the very complicated issue of Black involvement in a criminal justice system that many have labeled as inimical to
Black development in America.
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American society and its basic institutions operate within a time
tested framework of both class and racial subordination for its Black
citizens. However, it is within the American criminal justice system
that we see this class and race bias in its most heinous form.' Edwin
M. Schur, for example, takes the rather unique position that it is the
American society that is in fact criminal. It is criminal by virtue of
its unequal distribution of wealth, its glorification and justification
2
of violence abroad, Pnd its racism, sexism, and classism at home.
Similar views are held by Black scholars such as Dr. James A. Joseph, who
in an article in the Black Scholar stated, "inadequacies in the distribution of wealth and power in the American society ppovide the basic
5
deterence to Justice.J Both Hamilton and Carmichael', and Kenneth Clark
give more detailed analysis of this class and race bias in their works.
Even Blacks woricng within the criminal justice system are beginning to
voice their recognition of these inequities. For example, at a 1975
black correctional workers conference in California a featured speaker
began his talk by stating, "the justice system in America is criminal."
This cerment brought on wholesale approval in the form of prolonged applause, amens, laughter, and other forms of non verbal approval. At
first glance, this apparent agreement with the speakers condemnation of
the criminal justice system is somewhat misleading in view of the way in
which black workers are involved, and are attempting to be involved, in
its administration. Fbr example, out of a total police population of
362,396, Blacks numer less than twenty-five thousand.6 The situation
is even more critical when it comes to the judicial system. Out of a
pool of 21,000 judges, only 250 are black and the majority of these are
in the federal court systen.7 The situation in Washington, D.C., a predominately black city, gives a clear picture of what Blacks are up

against.
After decades in which Washington's courts had no more
than one black judge, there are now 15 black men and
women among D.C. Superior Courts 44 judges, two blacks
on the nine judge D.C. Court of Appeals, four black
jusges among a total of 15 on the U.S. District
Court Bench and one Black judge among the nine on the
U.s. Court of Appeals.8
In both correctional institutions, social work, probation, nd
parole, the nunbers of blacks are grudgingly being increased. After the
urban disturbances of the 1960's, the Kerner Ccrmmission recognized the
value of increasing the number of blacks in police work and other social
control agencies.9 This, coupled with recent meager gains through civil
rights and affirmative action legislation have afforded upwardly mobil
blacks employment opportunities. So, what we begin to see is a situation
where blacks in seareh of the good life increasingly find themselves
working in public agencies concerned with social control and regulation.
Robert Blauner makes the following observation concerning this issue:
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Since the racial colonialism of the United States is
embedded in a contex of industrial capitalism, the
colonized must look to the economy, division of
labor, and politics of the larger society for their
individual and group aspirations I0
What we observe then is a situation where Blacks, like other colonized people throughout the world, attempt to better their condition
individually, while at the same time protecting the collective interests
of the dominate white society.
The following cormients by Staples suggests, In part at least, the
futility of Blacks working within existing goverrnental structures:
Those members of the power elite charged with maintaining
racial hanony have apparently decided on a policy of
neocolonialism for the black community. Black leaders
who are responsible to them and ccmitted by worling
within the system are gradually replacing the white
authority figures as leaders or members of the police
force, military, prisons, welfare systems, etc. No
fundamental changes have been made in institutional
values or functioning but the replacement of whites
with blacks tends to underline the resistence of
blacks to institutional oppression, especially those
who viewed it solely as a racial issue. 11
One only has to examine the increased number of black workers in
prisons, police organizations, probation, and social work to get some
understanding for the merits of Staples' position. Without getting into
an extensive debate on the issue here, there are significant numbers of
Blacks, many of whom work in the criminal justice system, who are comitted to the system. They justify their position by focusing on the need
for change. -hey are concerned with the way the system fmnctions and
how the results impact on Blacks caught within it.
Their contention is
that it is strategic to attack the system from within to have maxin
impact.
This concern for change within the crimipal justice system is having
an impact not just on Black workers, but on their white colleagues, and
indeed, upon the system as a whole.
Ine only has to point to the large
number of Black caucuses, and Black parallel organizations springing
into existence throughout the country to get some measure of the concern being expressed.* These groups, for the most part, are focusing
*There is presently several Black police workers associations in the
U.S., a National Association of Black Social Workers, and California has
taken the lead in being one of the first states to form a Black Probation and Parole Officers Association.
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on the role of the Black worter in the criminal justice system, and are
beginnirng to demand change in the content, structure, and philosophy of
that system. The term "system" may be inappropriate in this context since
one of Websters' definitions is "a regular orderly way of doing scmethirg."
Those familiar with criminal justice in this country would generally
classify it as anything but "regular and orderly."
While there is presently no uniform thrust, !lack organizations
throughout the country are beginning to recognize their unique position
in the area of criminal Justice. Typically, these Black organizations
are demanding (1) more input into decision making, (2) the appointment
of more black and minority personnel, (3) a shift in philosophy in reference to punishment and rehabilitation, (4) a more positive recognition
of the distinctiveness of Blackness and, (5) a couuittment to reduce
societal criminal acts against the individual. While these concerns are
couched in a Black perspective, the advocates believe serious attention
to than will lead to a better, more progressive criminal justice system
for the society as a whole.
On the other hand, there are those who take the position that the
American criminal justice system is little more than a tool of internal
colonialism. They argue that the system works as an instrtment of coercion, deterence, regulation and, above all, control. 1 2 While Frantz
Fanonl 3 , Charles Hamilton and Stokely Carmichaell4 adhere to this colonialism position, Robert Staples has reintroduced it by suggesting that
the criminal justice system is one of the mainstays of a colonial system
that politically distributes a particular type of justice through the use
of police, prisions, and other institutions. Staples is particularly
critical of the ccplicity of the political states and the judicial systen in failing to prosecute and convict police officers accused of brutality toward Blacks .15
In a 1971 article that appeared in the Black Scholar, Robert Chrissman
went so far as to refer to all Black people as "outlaws." He states,
'e are most subject to arrest - nd the most frequent victims of crime.
Over 40% of prison inmates in the State of California are Black. More
blacks than whites are executed in the United States."6 (More on this
later).
What we see then is a dilemra for Black people that make decisions
difficult at best and dangerous at worst. The objectives here are to
analyze the criminal justice system from a Black perspective, to clarify
issues as they relate to Blacks and other minorities in the system, and
to propose new courses of action so that criminal justice can become more
positively meaningful and respected within Black ccmmunities throughout
the country.
Cne of the basic concerns of many Blacks working in the criminal
justice system is to make the system more pertinent to the needs of
Black people, both as practitioners, Alients, 7nd victims. In relating
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American criminal Justice to the Black experience, one is immediately
concerned with same of the demands made by the profession on the Black
worker. There is an urgent need to understand the dilemmas arising from
Black workers operating within the structure and philosophy of the
criminal justice system.
The ever accumulating body of evidence against the workability of the
present criminal justice system, especially as it relates to Blacks, lays
a favorable foundation for the consideration of alternative structures.
6Xternative institutional mechanisms, properly constructed could insure
Black input and veto power at both the policy planning and implementation
levels. While such proposals initially will seem somewhat bizarre to the
traditional bureaucratic manager, there is enough sociological and psychological inferences available to substantiate the assumption that environmental conditions, cultural isolation, racism, otc., have8 created
differences in reality as perceived by Blacks and whites.17,1 ,19,20
In short, those taking this position are of the opinion that Black expertise is not being properly utilized, and that for reasons of racism,
politics, and economics, Blacks are relegated to positions subserviant
to white planners and admnistators. Furthenmre, they argue that Black
attempts to gain better positions in existing institutions often work to
camouflage the need for different approaches to problem solving.
Blacks in Public Social Services
Blacks who have been through the American higher educational system
find themselves disproportionately represented in professions dealing with
the public sector, i.e., teaching, social work, nnd corrections. For
example, according to Time (June 17, 1974), in 1970, 39% of the nations
professionals were employed by federal, state, and local governments; but
60% of black professionals held such posts.21 A 1974 study completed by
the U.S. Department of Commerce makes the following facts available:
Blacks make up about 6 percent of the workers in
both wholesale and retail trade; nd finance,
insurance, and real estate, in contrast to 21
percent of the workers in personal service
industries, including private household; 14
percent of the workers in hospitals and other
health services; and 12 percent of the employees
in public administration. 22
It is rather ironic, but Blacks gravitate to these so called
"opportunity giving" positions because of a long history of denial and
rejection in the private sector. It is ironic simply because those who
have been denied opportunities in the private sector (Blacks) are employed in the public sector where they often are called upon to regulate the
behavior of others (Blacks) who have also been denied opportunities. In
effect, Blacks gaining middle class status through integration of public
agencies are invariably faced with conflicts in relation to how they
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interact with lower status Blacks who may depend upon, or be forced under
the dmain of public services. For example, the Black probation officer,
in carrying out his duties, is expected to take action against a probationer under his supervision who knowingly frequents the company of felons
(a cordition of probation in most states). In reference to the Black
probationer, this condition of probation creates an extreme conflict in
mar instances. Because of his race, socio-economic status, and the additional stigma of being on probation, his options in regard to living
arrangements, support, friends, and employment are limited. In carrying
out his duties, the probation officer is expected to enforce this condition of probation, yet the probationer is often forced into violating
it.
This, or similar situations exist in the welfare system where indigenous ccmmnnity workers are called upon to "make the system work better,"
or where eligibility workers or welfare workers are forced to deny eligibility to Blacks who may not "technically" qualify for assistance. These
conditions often mean that Black professionals, both willingly and unwillixgly, ty the nature of their job assignments are forced to stand in the
path of the will and interests of poor Blacks. In short, the integration
of Blacks into the public employment sector often creates or perpetuates
class conflict, i.e., middle class Blacks against lower class Blacks.
As more and more Blacks enter the field of public human services this
class issue increases in importance. This, coupled with the question of
whether it is possible for Blacks orking within traditional social
agencies to help other Blacks, is it a matter of them helping only themselves, or is it possible to help both themselves and other Blacks simul23
and Stokeley
taneously? Robert Blauner, in Racial Oppression in America,
Carmichael and Charles Hamilton in black Yower 14 take the position that
working within these institutions of colonialism only act to strengthen
racial oppression. In fact, Blauner points out that "the key institutions
that anticolonialists want to take over or control our business, social
services, schools, and the police."25 Blauner further states that the
Black community is unique in the ways that white educators, policemen,
social workers, politicians, and other functionaries have exercised
econmic, political, and administrative control from the outside.2 6 Whites
have controlled the so called Black ghettoes from outside, and are now
beginning to use Blacks to do the same thing. Increasingly, we can also
say that Blacks who integrate these structures also live outside Black
ccmmunities.
To suggest that Blacks working in the area of human services are
perpetuating the colonialist condition is a serious charge, a charge
that merits further investigation, but at the same time a charge which
is extremely anxiety provoking for Blacks in corrections in particular.
Let us consider this dilemma.

If, in fact, these agencies are instruments of colonialism and
Blacks were able to withdraw, would the effects of colonialism be re-36 1-

duced? Some argue that if one participates in a structure causing problems for Blacks, then in fact he is the problem. Others argue, rather
convincingly, that Blacks do in fact make conditions better. On the
other hand, these arguments may be rather academic. It is Unrealistic to
expect that Blacks would be able to withdraw even if they were conclusively proven that these agencies were instruments of colonialism working
against the best interest of Blacks?
Jobs in the correctional field, for better or worse, have afforded
Blacks quasi-middle class status,, no matter how precarious it may be.
Since most of these positions are civil service positions they have
afforded Blacks a limited form of institutionalized upward mobility.
This Black mobility is also evident, if not significant, in such professions as firefighting, social work, and teaching.27 This means a decent
standard of living and at least the illusion of security. This is not
something that is taken lightly or given up easily. In a recent issue of
Harpers, Lewis H. Lapham in an article entitled "The Capitalists Paradox"
stated: "To a greater or lesser extent we are all greedy and frightened
children, and if the possession of money comes to mean the difference
between life and death, then how is it possible to blame people for whatever they do to obtain it?"28 While a few may accept such an analysis
and abandon their positions, the bulk of the Black population, whether
they accept this analysis or not, will feel compelled to remain in their
positions.
While there is merit in talking about a Black value system, and
taking action in the interests of Black people, often these concepts
are too abstract to the average person, expecially when weighed against
the concrete realities of the reward and punishment mechanisms available
to the dominant society. In very harsh terms there are many Blacks who
will stand on principal and conviction, but there are still
many whose
reality dictates that their actions are directed toward achieving the
rewards found within the system, the system supported by white society.
This is a complex issue that may be neither Black nor white, but has to
do with mans basic drive to survive and meet his most immediate needs in
a capitalistic society. Unfortunately, when it comes to meeting basic
needs, often one mans' Least is anothers famine. These concepts, to this
point, are relative to where one finds himself in relation to others.
Unfortunately, Black theoreticians and analysts have gone only
halfway, they. have analyzed situations, but have not proposed immediately
viable solutions, or at least solutions that are easily embraced by the
Black population as a whole. Because of an absence of Black group power
and the presence of white perrogatives, Blacks are invariably constrained
in their selection of work opportunities. While some progress is being
made, Blacks simply are not presently able to offer other Blacks working
in human services alternative work situations. Robert Blauner has noted
that racial privilege exists in all of our basic institutions and, ex'presses itself most graphically in the labor market and the structure of
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occupations. He further suggests that the key to white racial donination
in the United States has been their special advantage in the labor market.

29

While most people may spend little
time on these considerations, t'e
live in a society based on privilege and this terds to preface many of
our daily activities.
ntil Blacks can answer the question of where will
we work if not within white controlled institutions, any analysis of the
canditions of Black people is only partially useful.
Since mary Blacks in the humn services, especially the criminal
justice area, re not willing to blanketly accept the position that
working within white controlled institutions is counter productive to the
Black condition, it appears necessary to look at the arguement in favor
of such a stance.
Law and Ethnic Perrogatives
One of the difficult things for most Black Americans to totally
ccuprehend, but which many have sane knowledge of, "_s the fact that the
structural arrangements of the United States have been forged by, and
in the interests of the daminant white cultural groups.
Harold Cruse
states it clearly in the Crisis of the Negro Intellectual.
'"Ihe White
Anglo-Saxon Protestants, the White Catholics, and the White Jews are the
three main power groups in America under the political and economic
leadership of the Wasps."30 He goes on to indicate that "the American
constitution was conceived and written by White Anglo-Saxon Protestants
for a White Anglo-Saxon society.1'31 Turner and Starnes support this idea
with their belief that societies established on the principal of inequality produces superordinate classes with dominant beliefs that
rationalize the structure and outcame of the system. 32 Duberman refers
to Blacks as occupying a class system in the United States because they
are econamically deprived and politically castrated by the dominant group.33
T get further feeling for this structural inequality one must look to
the role of culture in a complex, heterogeneous society.
in theoretical terms we can say that interaction between members
of dcmirnnt and minority groups are determined by culture. The minority
and the daninant groups reference point in any interaction is invariably
culture. Vander Zanden suggests that, "the guideposts of the culture are
norms. Norms constitute generally accepted, sanctioned prescriptions
for or prohibitions against, various types of behavior.34 When various
ethnic, racial and class groups are forced together, if we are to maintain an ordered society, same rules, same methods of administering then
must be established.
This has became so commonplace until it seems
obvious to even the most casual observer.
The not so obvious however, is
how we go about determining what will be enforced and by whom.
According
to Jacobs in Justice in America, "administering justice means that norms
are being enforced in an even handled way so that the same standards
are applied to all citizens.35 When we cut through the idealism of
Jacob's supposition, we must determine who decides what cultural norms
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get formalized, and in which manner. What this has meant in this society,
9nd in most societies where there are subordinate and superordinate groups
interacting, "s that the dominant group has its cultural norms formalized.
The subordinate groups are forced into a position of accepting the formalized norms (laws) of the dominant society. The more significant of
these norms are enforced by the courts, embodied in the statutes, 3nd
in the tradition of the ccmunity.3 6 Over the years we have gotten so
accustomed to subjugating ourselves to these cultural guideposts until
both minority and dominant groups have integrated them into their cultural
behavior patterns. Kramer, in the American Minority Ccmiunity, :rakes
the following statement in reference to this point:
The dominant group by definition embodies the prevailing
way of life, it controls access to values that are now
desired by others, but still
too scarce to be shared, by
defining criteria of social eligibility. By declaring
ineligible those with differing characteristics, the
dominant group limits their life chances and thereby
creates a minority situation.37
Put in terms of values, Gil suggests that they (values) derive from
basic choices compatible with the perceived interests of groups who
gained influence, power, dominance, nnd control over the rest of society.
Eventually, values evolve into powerful factors legitimating established
interests and maintaining the status quo of social orders which is shaped
8
by interests.3
The white perrogative of having its groups cultural norms formalized
is indeed a privilege. Blauner suggests that this privilege white Americans enjoy is extremely advantageous to them and disadvantageous to
Blacks.39
The disadvantages in these areas because of white privileges are
most graphically obvious in the Black Americans peculiarly unfavorable
position in relation to the criminal justice system. Here it appears
that white privilege again reigns. For example, the following information taken from "The Social and Economic Status of the Black Population
in the United States" reflects in concrete term how white privilege
expresses itself in the criminal justice system:
Nearly 142,000 persons were confined in local jails in this
country as of mid-yrear 1972. Black irmates numbered 59,000
and comprised 42 percent of the jail population.. .Black
inmates were generally young (under 30), noorly educated
and urmarried (single, divorced, separated, or widowed).
Also sizable proportions were low-paid wage earners or
unemployed prior to their arrest... Among those on
appeal, the average sentences are prenerally longer for
blacks than for whites for all crimes of violence...
Eighty-one black persons were on death row in this
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country as of Decembaer 31, 1972. :n relation to their
proportion of the population, blacks were overrepresented
among the death row population accounting for exactly
one--,a.f of the total of 162 persons under sentence to
death... In the 38 year period prior to 1968, there were
2,066 black persons executed under the civil jurisdiction
in the United States and that ccmrised 54 percent
of
0
the 3,859 persons put to death over the period.
The point for those in the human services, especially correctional
workers, to grasp here is that the laws of the society in which we live
are the formalized cultural norms of the dominant white population, i.e.,
vtite protestants, white Jews, and white Catholics. These laws, in most
instances have been instituted to maintain, protect, and refine privileges of the white society. While many Blacks are protected by these
laws, and in other ways are advantaged by them, we must not lose sight
of the fact that the law and its administrative arrangements in this
country have been designed by white power groups to establish, maintain,
and refine their privileges.
Cften we have a difficult time understandIng this, a2specially when we see what appears to be mar Blacks making
it in the system. What we must remarier however, is that 33 percent of
America's Black families fall below the poverty level.. .About 5 million
Blacks collect same form of public welfare payments... and that the total
ruxber of Black families headed by females has also increased to about
34.5 percent.41 While same would argue that these conditions are caused
by poverty, ignorance, and cultural deprivation, there is a growing
accululation of evidence that suggests that Blacks find themselves in a
disadvantaged position in society because of the dominant societies
ability to define and label ,42 and because of the structure of American
society that favor the dminrnt group.
While the above conditions have became well known, more subtle
practices are just beginning to come to light. To give an example of how
same practices can have a detrimental impact on Blacks, lets take a look
at a process that has been in existence for years now in the juvenile
court system. In juvenile court proceedings, especially in California,
,.:e
have traditionally taken the position of "lets treat the juvenile
and not the offense." While on the surface this liberal sounding doctrine is great, what we have been able to determine is that by treating
the juvenile instead of the offense, we have systematically given Black
youth more involvement with the courts, more detention, longer detention periods, more probation, and longer probation terms in ratio
to their proportion of the population. "his greater involvemnt with the
criminal justice systen on the part of youth is undoubtedly related to
his reduced opportunity in socially accepted avenues, and therefore,
many suggest that it is only natural that Blacks would have more contact
with the legal system. While there is truth to this to some extent, it
could also -e ar-ued that since most law enforcement personnel, es-
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pecially judges are white and from a particular cultural background that
they do not possess the necessary background and insight to properly
"treat the juvenile", especially when he is Black. Why is it that we
do not label the judge as culturally deprived when he is unable to pick
up on the assorted cultural nuances often exhibited by Black youth in
the court setting? Many a Black child has incurred the wrath of judges
by their non traditional dress, their "sullen demeanor," their inability
to "look the man in the eye", and their appearance of "indifference."
These cultural differences, coupled with family structure, living
arrangements, school records, prior history, Eind even mode of dress are
often so alien to the probation officer and the judge until it is almost
impossible to "treat the juvenile." To be unable to "treat the juvenile"
then is a structural weakness related to racism and the selection process
of the Black youth caught up in the system, yet this process catapults
many a Black youth down the road to a life of adult crime. William Ryan
refers to this process of blaming those who are least able to defend
themselves as "blaming the victim. "43
To further substantiate the Black mans particular relationship to
the law we could point the finger at former San Francisco Mayor Alioto's
Zebra edict, (stopping and questioning all Black males). This practice
was put into effect in the effort to apprehend murder suspects who were
identified by survivors of attacks as being "Black". At a higher level
we notice the federal governments reluctance to vigorously enforce the
law in relation to busing or even former President Ford's appearances
on national television in opposition to court ordered busing. large
numbers of Blacks view this as the governments abandonment of the civil
rights movement and the rights of Blacks to a fair and decent standard
of living in this country.
Haywood Burns, the National Director of the Conference of Black
Lawyers, shares the following penetrating remarks regarding the Black
mans position in relation to the American legal system:
Whereas white Americans are accustomed to viewing the
law as an historical vehicle through which liberties
have been progressively expanded, black Americans
have experienced law in quite another fashion.
From the very first, American law has been the
means by which the generalized racism in the
society has been made specific and converted into
the particularized policies and standards of
social control.44
This is not an attempt to justify Black crime, or to suggest that
there are no acts for which Blacks should be punished, because it is
painfully clear that there is some need in this area. Data gathered
as of 1973 indicates that "blacks were much more likely than whites to
have been the victims of violent crimes; the victimization rate was
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45
47 per 1,300 population for blacks as compared to 32 for whites."

To further support the need in this area, we only need to refer to the
rather dramatic title of Why Blacks Kill Blacks by Alvin Poussaint,46
Black Rage by Grier and Cobbs,47 or The Wretched of the Earth by Franz
Fanon. 40 If we add the less dramatic but equally pervasive crimes of
unscrupulous realtors, car salesmen, and other merchants that are enacted
against the Black community, then it becomes quite clear that Blacks also
have a right to be concerned about crime. Blacks in just about every
socioeconomic position scream for law and order, but this is not the issue
here. The relevant issue, or issues, have to do with the purpose of
existing laws, their fairness to Blacks, and Blacks working within administrative bodies that enforce these laws. While there is a need, and
while jobs in the area of corrections do pay relatively well in comparison
to other possibilities in the human services, is this the place for Blacks
to focus their energies? Can Blacks have an affect on police, courts,
adult and authorities, and parole boards when these bodies all tend to
be administered from the top down? In other words, -4nthe places where
decisions and policy are made, few if any Blacks are represented. This
is an increasingly important issue to more and more Blacks as they come
to the realization that whites, are well intentioned as they may be, have
a difficult, "f not impossible, time seeing things from the same perspective as Blacks. It is almost an impossibility to have an impact on
decisions affecting Blacks if Blacks find themselves continually in positions where they can only react. Access to decision making positions
is the key type of change Blacks are looking for in the criminal justice
system. Actually, it is even more complex than just access, tecause even
with access it is possible to outvote or to veto the actions and decisions
of Blacks. As equally important as access, is the ability to influence
and in some instances to control the decisions made or to be made. One
could easily say that it is extremely naive to expect that white society
is going to give up control of any part of the criminal justice system,
or for that matter, any system. While there may be truth to this, it
does not negate the fact that one of the surest ways to insure that
institutions will serve Black people best is to see that Blacks control
them. Cb, if control is not possible at the present time this should
not prevent Blacks from seriously discussing it or beginning to formulate
intermediate strategies leading to this control. Others take the position that even thinking about controlling something "belonging to whites"
is an exercise in futility, and the only answer is to establish separate
institutions and alternatives for Blacks.
A Dilemma
The difficulty Blacks working in the criminal justice system have
with formulating a clear position in relation to what their attitudes
and behavior should be in relation to the system is undoubtedly related
to the rewards- unishnent mechanism, the acculturation process, and the
closely related status of their position. Peter I. Rose had some
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relevant ideas in relation to this acculturation process and black people:
The black experience in America is unique--4-t has no
real parallel. And black Americans are unique. Parad3oxically, blacks may well be at once the most estranged
and the least foreign of all the citizens: -nost estranged
because of their special history, "-hich began in subforms of segregation; least foreign because, ironically,
1
aving been cut off from their native roots, they had
few guides but those of the master and his agents.
This is not to say that no Africanisms survived. Of
course they did. Still most black Americans, for good
or ill,
were imbued with many of the same goals and
aspirations of those of the dominant group.49
This socio-17istorical process coupled with the rewards-punishment
mechanism makes it exceedingly difficult to make clear choices, because
in reality the choices are so clouded and, in many instances down right
dangerous.
While many Blacks adjust to their work role in this society, rnd
some never seriously question it, the position of Blacks working in the
criminal justice system is a difficult and peculiar one worthy of a great
deal of study. Long, et al. have the following thoughts about this
adaptation:
In adapting to this setting, Blacks perpetuate the harmful enviror nent and also develop hostile feelings in re3ponse to discrimination thus adding their own punishment
to that inflicted by whites. The caste system maintains a cadre of whites and middle class blacks who function in a refined or brutal way to preserve the system.5O
So what we see is a complicated push-pull, love-hate situation where
blacks are trying to integrate the criminal justice system, the system
initially resisted their inclusion, and then selectively included them
throughout the system at the lower and mid management levels. This
coupled with the "good" of the money to be made in the system, and the
"bad" of a system that has worked in a detrimental way in regard to
Blacks makes choices more difficult as Blacks become more conscious of
their blackness and how it relates to the criminal justice system in
this country. This Black awareness coupled with white resistance and control has created a climate of tension and apprehension where either change
or extreme conflict is inevitable. Hylan Lewis makes this point with
appropriate bluntness:
The pressure to change not only structure, but the
control and accountability of service institutions
are clearly related to the new consciousness of
Blacks and to the related emergence of the fact and
concept of acute black consciousness.71
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The problem is, however, that change in a capitalistic system tends
to be conservative and incremental and when it comes to the condition
of minorities more geared toward containment and appeasement than true
social reform.
While the above pages have raised some serious issues in reference
to the criminal justice system and Black involvement within it,
this system
in one form or another will undoubtedly be with us for some time to come.
Since Blacks will surely be a part of it,
there is an impelling need to
understand its purpose, hw it works, and who it serves.
A thorough
analysis may lead to the conclusion that Blacks can serve no useful purpose
working within this system.
On the other hand, such an analysis may support
the position that structural changes in strategic areas of the system,
coupled with philosophical shifts could make it viable to the population
as a whole.
Still
another thought for consideration is the possibility
that any analysis, no matter how focused, will not be enough to drastically shift the level of Black involvement in the criminal justice system.
For better or worse many Blacks view it as their lifeline, their way of
surviving in a hostile environment that offers so few options.
The Double Bind for Black Social Workers
In addition to the difficulties suffered by Black workers mentioned
above, there is an additional problem for Black social workers shared
with the profession in general.
Mainly, social workers in the criminal
justice system have been traditionally viewed with suspicion, 4niifference,
and even hostility.
in a system whose social welfare function is questionable at best, social workers are frequently supervised and directed by
non social workers.
In police departments, when and if social workers
are found, they tend to be employed on specially funded projects and are
rarely in key decision making positions regarding day to day police activities. While probation officers have a good deal of authority in the
courts there are two factors that frequently limit them in carrying out
social work values.
First, and most obvious is the fact that most probation officers are not trained social workers and, secondly, judges have
ultimate authority over the decisions of probation officers.
In the
prison setting, social workers are so few in relation to the prison
population as to render them virtually useless.
For example, at the
Philadelphia Prison System, social workers report that they are assigned
the names of prisoners alphabetically.
The lists
are so long it is
impossible to do anything but wait until a prisoner presents them with
problems. While such a pairing of prisoner to social worker may have
some administrative merit, it leaves many unanswered questions in regard
to its effect in any treatment process.
In short, we have non social
workers supervising social workers in the justice system. The objectives
of the non social workers often conflict with the goals (values) of the
social work profession.
While it has been argued that social work is in
colusion with the criminal justice system to maintain social control,
-t at least has a code of ethics that states in part, "I regard as my
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primary obligation the welfare of the individual or group served, vhich
includes action for improving social conditions. "52 While there is growing
debate over just which individuals or groups social work serves, when we
look at the Justice system it becomes clear that it serves none well.
or various reasons the pre-Lelinquent, the delinquent, the adult offender,
the imprisoned adult offender, and the released adult offender all tend
to suffer from inadequate positive social intervention. On the other- 53
hand, as the number of policemen hired increases so does the crime rate,
with the newest treatment scheme comes increased recidivism rates and
the costs of incarceration continues to rise.
There is a growing body of evidence suggesting that the criminal
justice system in America is corrupt and unjust. With social work, and
Black social workers in particular, demanding more involvement in it,
many observers liken such an effort to the futility of rushing into a
burning building.
If such an analysis has any validity at all, it may suggest inten3ified social work efforts in less traditional criminal justice settings.
7ocial workers have an obligation to push the troubled criminal justice
system more in the direction of cacxiuity based corrections. Such programs and concepts as halfway houses, screening programs, work release,
crime prevention and diversion programs must be looked at as serious
ccmponents of the criminal justice system. Presently, when such programs
exist they tend to be federally funded and at rates that doom most to
failure.
For the Black social worker, community treatment programs could,
and often do, mean getting in on the ground floor of a positive approach
to corrections. According to Prassel:
Cormiunity treatment serves as the normal means of
attempting corrections. Offenders, juvenile or
adult, should be channeled into individual programs
through probation, aftercare, or parole. Diverse
forms of treatment available through a multitude of
agencies can then provide care, assistance, and
supervision.,4
In addition to the treatment possibilities in community treatment
approaches, there is the added possibility of Black leadership and
direction in such efforts. Since funding for such efforts traditionally
come from governmental bodies there is still the problem of Black-White
confrontations over what programs should be funded and at what level.
The present system continues to exist, in part at least, because
of vested interests of select groups that are rewarded by its existence.
Ps social workers we have an obligation to work against these interests
and for the welfare of Blacks, other minorities and the oppressed in
general.
A Framework for Criminal Justice System Analysis
Arguments presented to this point have been intended to demonstrate
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that Blacks workirg ithin the criminal justice system are indeed a
unique group, 4th a unique relationship to a system that has had a unique
relationship to Blacks in American society. Arguments for and against
the future of Blacks working in the criminal Justice system are worthy
of much thought and intense examination, but a basepoint for this exam-nation must be established. There is a need to be able to identify the
relevant components of the system and how they function in reference to
Black people. rThen, knowing throughly how the system acts on, 'gainst,
or for Blacks can be a take off point for acting on the system. Sure,
we all say we know the system works against Blacks, but do we really?
To best get at how the system impacts on Blacks, a simple framework for
analysis would appear to be appropriate.
The framework proposed here would be one that basically asked the
following questions in reference to Blacks in the criminal justice
system:
1. What is the extent of Black involvement in the
criminal justice system?
2. Who has authority?
3. How is this authority used in relation to Blacks?
4. What is the outcome from the usage of this authority?
By focusing on these areas it is anticipated that information can
be attained to either support calls for changes in the structure of the
system in reference to Blacks that no matter how good the economic rewards,
their involvement is too high a committment to make.
-he effort here is not to present an all inclusive examination of
the issues surrounding Black involvement in the criminal justice system.
Tb the contrary, it is believed that by beginning the discussion others
will join in a detailed analysis of the system and the alternatives
available to Blacks within it.
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SYSTEMIC PERSPECTIVISM:

A NEW BASIS FOR EVALUATIVE RESEARCH
Richard A. Ball

West Virginia University

ABSTRACT--Evaluative research has not kept pace with developments
in the theory of social planning and the philosophy of science.
If
evaluation is to contribute to social planning, evaluators must recognize that planning is a political process. The method of systemic
perspectivism may be able to provide a means of combining the virtues
of general systems theory with a perspectivistic view of objectivity,
allowing for a transactive planning which involves the public.

My purpose here is to describe what I consider to be the major
problem facing evaluative research and to indicate one direction by
which we might develop a methodology capable of providing a reasonable
solution. The problem has to do with the place of evaluation in the
planning process. Social planning as we have known it has tended toward one of two extremes; either the process has been characterized by
a rather chaotic eclecticism influenced by all sorts of questionable
motives, or it has followed a highly centralized, "social engineering"
approach. The former is clearly inappropriate, but the latter is itself
a matter of increasing social debate. What we need now is a new vision
of social planning and a methodology of evaluation which augments it.
Social engineering was developed In a time of rapidly centralizing
institutions which maintained a reality hegemony. These institutions
dominated planning because they had stepped into a near vacuum with
clear goals, a confidence born of faith in the application of technology, and a sense of their own power. Today it is different. Our goals
are now matters of political negotiation. We have begun to realize that
purely technological solutions may sometimes pose serious moral dilemmas. And some of the old arrogance of power is gone. Still, as long
as the evaluator remains a technician who does the bidding of the politician and the professional planner, we are not likely to see genuinely
sophisticated evaluative research or to witness the day when it becomes
a truly integral part of planning.
It is therefore necessary that the
evaluator look beyond his traditionally narrow province and concern himself with the larger issues of planning and even with the philosophy of
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science. He must understand that the planning process is political
rather than technical, and instead of complaining about this fact of life
he must learn to see it as appropriate to any society which presumes to
become a democracy.
If he accepts this view, he must seek to shift his
own role so as to broaden and deepen the functions of evaluation. Recent developments in the philosophy of science suggest that this shift
might be accomplished through a method of systemic perspectivism. To
understand what is entailed here, we must first consider developments
in the theory of social planning and then turn to questions of the philosophy of science. Social planning is the key to the evaluation question,
for evaluation must be an integral part of the planning process. The
philosophy of science may provide us with some new answers.
Developments in the Theory of Social Planning
Since our conceptions of evaluative research are embedded in our
general views of planning, it is well to begin with the latter. What
we discover is that some very significant changes are taking place in
the theory of social planning. These changes are reflected in a repudiation of the social engineering model and in an increasing emphasis
upon distributive equity (Webber, 1965) and societal learning models
(Dunn, 1971). What these newer approaches have in common is an appreciation of the difference between functional rationality and substantive
rationality in planning. Functional rationality attends to the efficient
relation of means to given ends. It is the province of the "expert,"
and its guiding principle is efficiency.
It rests upon the complicated
assumption that there is always one best way of dealing with a situation,
that this is synonymous with technical efficiency, and that technical
efficiency rests upon the ability to control all relevant factors. The
consequence is allocative planning, based on the distribution of limited
resources among a number of competing users (Friedmann, 1973:52). Examples of the results of such a narrow orientation may be found in the
increasing number of carefully documented studies of the actual consequences of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and planning, programming, budgeting systems (PPBS) (McKean and Anshen, 1965; Rivlin, 1969; Schick,
1971). These apparently precise techniques are usually nothing but a
means of legitimating and fine-tuning decisions which have already been
made.
The definition of evaluation as measurement of the outcome of a
"social experiment' is an unrealistic remnant of social engineering." It
can be traced to the older view which required only technicians capable
of testing the efficacy of means and to a reluctance to face several
harsh facts of life. To begin with, the evaluator rarely has much control over the "experiment" (Ball, 1977). There are particularly trea-

cherous pitfalls associated with evaluative research, which, unlike the
sheltered laboratory work so characteristic of the older sciences, often
finds Itself In non-cooperative, actively resistant and sometimes deliberately misleading environment (Gouldner, 1965).
The Issue of causality represents another serious set of questions
which must eventually be faced, simply because the notion of unillnear
cause-effect has little relevance In a complicated, Interdependent and
rapidly shifting social milleu (Ball, 1977; Weiss and Rein, 1969). The
singling out of "Independent" and "dependent" variables In such cases Is
largely a matter of which segment of a chain of events Is selected for
study. That Is why Katz (1971:56), citing the Increasing Importance of
social research In Supreme Court decisions, has entered a plea for a
"model by means of which scholars may direct themselves explicitly toward the Investigation of the empirical and logical foundations alleged
to Justify the causal Inferences that underlie the official policy under
Investigation." He argues that much official policy may rest upon "dlshonest pretensions" and that one function of policy research Is to "unmask" the causal fallacies upon which these pretensions rest. We encounter the same problems when we turn from a discussion of "causes" to an
examination of "effects." The focus upon effects defined as "primary",
along with an Insensitivity to the secondary and tertiary effects of a
given policy, represents one of the most serious violations of the principle of distributive equity central to recent theories of democratic
social planning (Webber, 1965). Which effects are to be considered

primary?
Finally, there Is the unpleasant fact that the evaluation criteria
themselves are often selected by someone else In terms of his own deflnItion of "success" and "failure". Suchman (1967:61), classifies the
criteria according to which the success or failure of a program can be
evaluated In terms of effort (Input assessment), effectiveness (output
assessment), Impact (output relative to need), cost effectiveness (input to impact ratio) and Process (descriptive and diagnostic analysis
of the process by which results are produced), but maintains that the
study of process Is really not an Inherent part of evaluative research
(Suchmn, 1967:21). Those who do express some Interest have tended to
equate process evaluation with rudimentary administrative monitoring
(see, for example, Rossi and Williams, 1972:110). One reason for the
skeptical attitude of many experienced politicians and administrators
toward current evaluation research Is their realization that the technical approach captures only a caricature of the political and social
realities with which they must deal (Rock, 1965). There Is certainly
limited practical value to the findings derived through the orthodox
designs. If we are very fortunate, we may learn what has happened, but
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the question of how it happened goes unanswered except for our often
simplistic assumptions about the variables which are "independent" and
those which are "dependent."
If the policy is a "failure" it may not
be clear just why, and even if judged a "success", we have no reasonable certainty that we can repeat the process.
In contrast to the technical narrowness of functional rationality,
substantive rationality rests upon intelligent insight into the behavior
of complex system as a whole, including a grasp of its ambiguities.
It
is concerned with the ends of action as much as with the means. It is
in the broadest sense political rather than technical. Substantive rationality makes possible innovative planning which is concerned with
larger questions of change and is characterized by an accent upon the
merging of planning and action activities. It leads us to a process of
"transactive planning" based upon involvement of all concerned (Friedmann, 1973). A proper social planning process is really an information
processing system. The better the information and the more effective
the processing,
the better the planning decisions.
We need better ways of getting information. Social planning has
long been characterized by institutionalized selective perception. The
process has been organized so as to give planners certain information.
Some means must be found to make transactive planning a reality, so that
all communication lines are open and attention is paid to the diversity
of goals which is to be found in a complex, modern society. I believe
that evaluative research has a major part to play here.
We also need to improve our information-processing, our sequence of decision-making. At the present time we find that decision-makers are
relatively isolated from immediate environmental feedback. They are
sheltered from the consequences of their decisions. We must open up
this process at every stage of development. Evaluative research may
also be our most important asset in this struggle for more effective
means of collective learning.
Evaluative Research and the Philosophy of Science
Our preoccupation with social engineering in the traditional sense
springs partly from our suspicion of "subjectivity." Evaluators are
much concerned with the problem of subjectivity, and a great deal has
been written over the issue of value-neutrality.
Indeed, social engineering makes much of the possibility that it can be handled through a
purely positive science which will eliminate the subjective element.
Social planning, however, involves value judgements, and there is no
way around this. Moreover, these questions of values cannot be separ-
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ated from the so-called "objective" facts of a situation.
40) has put it very effectively:

Vickers (1965:

An appreciation involves making judgements of fact
about the "state of the system," both Internally and
in its external relations.
I will call these reality
judgements. These include judgements about what the
state will be or might be on various hypotheses as well
as judgements of what is and has been. They may thus
be actual or hypothetical, past, present, or future.
It also involves making judgements about the significance of these facts to the appreciator or to the body
for whom the appreciation is made. These judgements
I shall call value judgements. Reality judgements and
value judgements are inseparable constituents of appreciation... The relation between judgements of fact and
of value is close and mutual; for facts are relevant
only in relation to some judgement of value and judgements of value are operative only in relation to some
configuration of fact.
As Kuhn (1973) has reminded us, the history of science discloses a
tendency to elaborate and sanctify the dominant paradigm until it constitutes the very definition of science, setting the legitimate range of
inquiry, identifying research targets within that range, and dictating
appropriate methodology. The social engineering approach to planning
rests upon a positivist framework which assumes the existence of an
objective reality external to us and of an "objective" expert who can
describe It (Kolakowski, 1969), and this is the same epistemological
It
framework which undergirds our contemporary notion of evaluation.
is assumed that experts have access to the sphere of absolute reality
by way of strategies of quantification and experimentation (Kolakowski,
1969). Unfortunately, the tendency to attribute to this realm of "truth"
a unitary nature (Holzner, 1968) and to conceive of it as absolute and
eternal, static and changeless (Kolakowski, 1969) tends to produce a
reification of one point of view as the scientific truth of the matter.
This bias has interfered with the development of methods of equitable
evaluation, which may be defined as evaluative research which includes
the best possible representation of the diverse viewpoints to be found
in a highly differentiated, "open" society (Ball, 1977). The "truth"
turns out to be the version preferred by a certain segment of society.
Recently, however, we have begun to appreciate the extent to which
social life is an actually constructed reality (Berger and Luckmann,
Friedmann (1973) makes this notion central to his
1967; Holzner, 1968).
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theory of transactive planning, emphasizing the viewpoint as developed
by Mannheim (1936). At the same time, some research methodologists
have begun to stress the same orientation (Sjoberg and Nett, 1968).
Although one can hardly expect a new paradigm to emerge full-blown, it
may be worthwhile to consider general directions. At this point, it
appears that evaluative research might benefit greatly by explicit recognition of the extent to which reality is socially constructed through
the "intentionality" of actors whose meanings are formed in a matrix of
"inter-subjectivity"'(Berger and Luckmann, 1967). The merits of such an
approach are that it is politically sensitive to the changing nature of
social reality and that it emphasizes the political process which facilitate or impede planned change.
The approach with which we are dealing has been called perspectivism (Mannheim, 1936). It must not be confused with epistemological
idealism. This misunderstanding would appear to be the result of Husserl's emphasis upon attention to phenomena as they "appear" to us,
bracketing the question of whether or not they are "real." There has
been a great deal of confusion here. Strasser (1963:296-302) shows that
this "phenomenological impressionism" is essentially a "degeneration"
supported by tendencies toward a merely "suggestive" or "literary"
approach and criticizes the way in which phenomenology "came to be considered as an uncritical intuitionism." Referring to this trend as a
"strange attitude of mind," he points out that "no attention was paid
to the fact that the naiveness of seeing, which received so much praise,
could not even be genuine, for authentic naiveness is not aware of itself" (Strasser, 1963:297). Far from denying the existence of the world,
perspectivism insists that all thought must be treated as "situated" in
the world. Unlike the vulgarized versions of phenomenology which have
become so popular, perspectivism insists with Heidegger that some method
is needed precisely because the phenomena are not immediately given.
Although Mannheim gave us a new basis for soziai planning, he did
not succeed in providing a satisfactory methodology beyond an emphasis
upon the importance of substantive rationality and faith in the possibilities of a "detached intelligentia" which could learn to think in
perspectivistic terms. The problem, then, is to find a method which
will allow us to take account of social diversity. This would appear to
require that we accept some sort of "processual model" of social systems. Following Buckley (1967:17), we may regard the processual model
as an underdeveloped paradigm with a long history extending from the
work of Whitehead, Einstein, Dewey and Bentley in physical science and
philosophy to that of Marx, Simmel, Cooley and Thomas in social science.
As Buckley himself has stressed, this model is most clearly exemplified
by general systems theory (GST).
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The "perspectivism" of Mannheim and the "Biperspectivism" of GST
(Laslo, 1972:119) stress a holistic approach and the epistemological
importance of perspective rather than the isolation of analytical variables assumed to be independent of perception.
Instead of arguing over
the importance of subject vs. object, both attempt to concentrate on
relationships in the form of interplay between the two, and both emphasize feedback loops rather than "causes."
Sutherland (1974:55) quotes
with approval the following statement:
Analysis has to proceed at two levels: that of
phenomenology, that is of direct experience, encompassing perception of outside things, feeling, thinking, willing, etc., and of conceptual constructs, the
reconstruction of direct experience in systems of
symbols, culminating in science, it being well understood that there is no absolute gap between precept
and concept, but that the two levels intergrade and
interact (von Bertalanffy, 1967:94).
The "reconstruction of direct experience in systems of symbols" is
another definition of GST. A combination of perspectivism and GST provides a method which may be designated as systematic perspectivism.
Since I have dealt with this method elsewhere (Ball, 1977) there is no
need to go into much detail as to the actual practice of systemic perspectivlsm. What I am concerned about here is its applicability to the
newer vision of social planning. It is especially applicable to the
notion of societal learning, because one would expect information exchange to open a variety of feedback loops, leading to more efficient
mapping of perceived reality and an emerging consensus as to its nature.
Information is in fact sometimes defined as that input which increases
order. Only when the public is deeply involved in mutual learning
through some sort of transactive planning is it possible to open up information flow. Social engineering actually tends to close off information, giving a surface appearance of order which only serves to hide the
disorder beneath.
My own experience, including evaluations of Community Action Agencies developed during the War on Poverty, assessments of curriculum impact, and evaluation of criminal justice programs, suggests that systemic perspectivism might be a powerful tool for policy studies. During
the evaluation of one Community Action Agency, policy was seen not as an
"experiment" (which implies tight control, clear resolution of the causality problem, and the power of the experimenter to select the experimental criteria) but rather as a new component introduced within an ongoing system. It became clear that the program of the Agency was signi-
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ficantly affected by such external variables as the pattern of power in
the local community and that these forces had to be identified and their
effect somehow assessed. The approach which was worked out has been deIt led to the construction of
scribed in detail elsewhere (Ball, 1970).
a model of coalitions of power which represented a system operating in
accordance with specific rules but shifting its internal structure with
variations in issues, with disagreements endemic to the system itself,
and with the inputs of suprasystems external to the local community.
Different definitions of events were held by different factions, but the
foundations of these perspectives could be determined. The planners were
occasionally among the least objective participants in the "experiment."
Such an approach means that we move to make the neglected question
of process our central area of inquiry, using the merely technical questions of effort, effectiveness, impact, and cost effectiveness as subsidiary aspects of the process itself. Such an approach would allow us to
direct the unrealized potential for evaluation to every stage of social
policy. Evaluative research has so far tended to be of little help here,
being generally limited to the implementation stage and the measurement
of input-output differences. This conception of evaluation is not based
upon an analysis of the data requirements underlying sound public policy,
but is simply the logical outcome of adherence to the social engineering
tradition. What is urgently needed is research and development with an
emphasis upon the development of more effective means of problem definition and policy formulation. We must deal with the entire process.
Evaluative research must itself be evaluated primarily in terms of
its applicability to contemporary planning problems and not as another
interesting academic exercise. Opportunities appear to be most promising if the evaluator can see research neither as the simple testing of
a priori hypotheses nor as an unguided "exploration," but as a continuous self-corrective process of successive approximations leading toward
"grounded theory" (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Among other things, this
means that theoretical sampling, a technique by which the process of
data collection is controlled by the emerging theory, must be employed
as a complement to the usual statistical sampling based on pre-selected
criteria. As I have tried to explain in greater detail elsewhere (Ball,
1977), the evaluator who studies process must use a flexible methodology which combines the traditionally respected virtues of the detached,
rigorous data manipulating technicians with the practical abilities and
concerns of the skilled craftsman (Mills, 1959), the data gathering
opportunities of the strategically placed and highly trained participant
(Bruyn, 1966), the probing orientation of the clinician (Gouldner,1965),
the skepticism of the investigative journalist (Sjoberg and Miller,
1973) and even the opportunistic hypothesis formulation of the detective
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(Sanders, 1974).

This will make him of greatervalueto the planner.
Conclusion

The new emphasis in social planning takes us away from the older
social engineering tradition and toward a transactive planning which involves the public more closely. Planning is increasingly understood as
a political and not a technical process, as a question of societal learning rather than imposed solutions based upon the selective perception of
a technical elite. This change makes even more important the transition
from positivism to a view of society as a socially constructed reality,
a transition which is at the core of the contemporary philosophy of
science. It means that the perspectivism of Mannheim can be taken not
only as a basis for social planning, but also as a basis for its evaluation. Evaluative research can also draw upon general systems theory.
The combination of these two traditions provides us with a systemic perspectivism which can greatly broaden the functions of evaluative research,
so as to assist at every stage of social planning
It is important to emphasize the distinction between systemic perspectivism and the technical "systems analysis" approach to social planning. The latter represents social engineering.
It is a "new utopianism" in the sense that it carries the social engineering tradition to
extremes, tending to emphasize efficiency over the humanitarian values
of traditional utopian thought (Boguslaw, 1965). GST has now developed
beyond the extremely mechanistic positivism of systems analysis. Integrated with perspectivism, GST may actually provide a means of transcending the epistemological and sociopolitical pitfalls of systems analysis
without sacrifice of rigor.
Systemic perspectivism may allow us to take account of our lack of
experimental controls, avoid spurious causal attributions, and assume a
more politically sophisticated stance with respect to criteria selection.
Even If we could attain it, do we really want to make the public into
"subjects" for experimentation? We can continue to maintain the fiction
here, or we may candidly acknowledge the lack of experimental controls
and accept the components of social policy as open systems rather than
closed experiments. A systemic perspectivism is capable of this, especially if the entire process is subjected to study.
It will also allow
the planners to involve the public fully without fear that this will
"bias the experiment." There is no doubt that such a stance would subject many evaluators to pressures which technicians are not usually
called upon to face. But unless the truth is acknowledged and means are
found to operate in the light of reality, evaluative research will lose
its leverage as a means of affecting public policy.
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As to the problem of causality, systemic perspectivism stresses the
extent to which "cause" and "effect" are matters of perspective. GST
tells us that reality is reciprocally related through feedback processes,
and these feedback processes involve a combination of value judgements
and reality judgements. What social planning must do is put the two together. Technical social engineering will not help us with this sort of
problem, but evaluative research which deals with the entire planning
process can tell us a great deal.
It should be clear that different goals and assessments of means
need not be viewed relativistically. Given that different groups observe
social reality from different perspectives, it is still possible that
some have a better vantage point than do others. If evaluation can be
extended to the study of secondary and tertiary effects, it will be possible to provide those concerned with valuable information which may
serve to clarify or even alter their perspectives. In this sense, information increases freedom of rational choice and may actually be thought
of as a basis for a more objective value judgment by all concerned. This
then is societal learning at its best. Although the subjective element
cannot be eliminated completely, it can be rendered more objective to
the extent that assumptions can be brought nearer alignment with reality
as perceived by a system willing to expose itself to environmental input. Systemic perspectivism can facilitate this. It is as a whole a
method of evaluative research almost ideally suited to the new problems
of social planning and the new theories which offer political rather
than technical solutions.
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THE LABELER AS AN INFLUENCE ON LABELING OUTCOMES*
Wallace 3. Gingerich
School of Social Welfare
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
ABSTRACT
Focusing upon labeling processes at the level of interpersonal
relations, this paper points out the general inattention to the labeler
as an influence on labeling outcomes. In addition, recent empirical
findings suggest not only that labeler variables may be associated
with outcomes, but that different labelers are influenced in different
ways by different factors in their interpersonal labeling.
Consequently, an effort is made to incorporate knowledge from social
perception theory into the labeling perspective in order to enhance
our understanding of interpersonal labeling processes. Several labeler
related variables which might be expected to influence labeling
outcomes are suggested.

One of the major assumptions made by the labeling perspective
is that the deviant label is applied discriminately to rule violators
(Becker, 1963; Schur, 1971; Quinney, 1970); that is, while the deviant
status may to some extent be earned, it may also be ascribed on the
basis of charactTristics of the subject other than his or her own
deviant behavior. This paper focuses upon labeling processes at the
level of interpersonal relations and, specifically, sources of variance
in how and upon what bases the deviant label is applied. Particular
attention is given to labeler related variables that may affect the
labeling outcome.
The existing literature in the area of interpersonal labeling is
reviewed briefly, noting a general lack of attention to the labeler as
an influence on labeling outcomes.
In addition, an implicit
assumption of existing labeling theory, that all labelers operate in
basically the same way, is called into queston on the basis of recent
empirical evidence.
Accordingly, a revision of the theory of
interpersonal labeling is proposed incorporating knowledge from the
areas of person perception and cognition. The result, hopefully, will
increase the theoretical understanding of labeler related influences in
interpersonal labeling, and will also provide a more realistic basis on
which to conduct further empirical investigations.

*The author wishes to thank John R. Hepburn and Carl E. Pope
for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
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THE CURRENT STATUS OF INTERPERSONAL LABELING THEORY
Investigations of interpersonal labeling
Much of the existing theoretical and empirical literature
investigating biases in the labeling of rule breakers focuses upon
status characteristics and/or other non-deviant behaviors of the
labelee. For example, studies of informal and formal processing of
deviants have usually focused upon labelee characteristics such as
age, sex, race, social class and prior offense record (Short and Nye,
1958; Piiavin and Briar, 1964; Gould, 1969, Williams and Gold, 1972;
and Cohen, 1974).
Another group of studies investigating the
determinants of police discretion in encounters with deviants included
the physical appearance and demeanor of the labelee in addition to
status characteristics (Skolnick, 1966; Wethman and Piliavin, 1967;
Westley, 1970; Black and Reiss, 1970; and Garrett and Short, 1975).
In a somewhat related vein, Dion (1972) examined the relationship of
the physical attractiveness of the child to deviance labeling by an
adult evaluator, and Shoemaker, South and Lowe (1973) found that the
facial expressions of labelees sometimes influence others' judgements
of guilt or innocence.
Other studies have taken a more situational perspective and
have found that variables such as the presence of witnesses (Reiss,
1971; Black and Reiss, 1970), departmental policy and procedures
(Clcourel, 1967; Wilson, 1968) and perceived risk to the community
may differentially influence the labeling outcome.
The studies cited thus far have focused primarily upon the
status characterisitcs and other non-deviant behaviors of subjects as
potential determinants of labeling. Some writers have suggested,
however, that such studies are too static and erroneously assume the
labelee is
a passive reactor in the labeling process.
More
specifically, the labelee may behave in such a way as to disavow or
otherwise "manage" his public presentation of self (Davis, 1961;
Goffman, 1963). Lorber (1967) characterizes the behaviors of the
labelee as a "performance" intended to moderate the labeling
outcome of the interaction. In an interesting observational study of
the behavior of the visably handicapped, Levitin (1975) illustrates how
actors may seek to alter their public indentity based upon the actual
nature of the disability itself and the social context of the encounter.
The Influence of the Labeler
Interestingly, although attributes and behaviors of the labelee
(e.g., social status, race, prior record, demeanor, performance) and
situational factors
(e.g., organizational procedures, presence of
witnesses) have been considered to be potential influences on
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labeling, there has been very little recognition of the importance of
the labeler on the outcome of the interpersonal labeling process. One
exception is the work of Scott (1970) on the construction of
conceptions of stigma by professional experts. In that paper Scott
asserts convincingly that both the prevailing cultural values and the
professionalization and advanced training of the labeler may
influence the labeling outcome. Outside the labeling literature per
se, however, studies of person perception and clinical judgement
regularly include the labeler as an important determinant of the
labeling outcome (Tripodi and Miller, 1966; Moos and Clemes, 1967;
Sarbin, et al, 1960).
Generally speaking, most empirical investigations also have
ignored the influence of the labeler on labeling outcomes. Several
studies are notable, however, by their explicit attention to the
labeler. Steffensmeier (1974), for example, found that high-dogmatic
adult subjects expressed more favorable attitudes toward law and
order (e.g., "the courts have gone too far in making rules which
protect the rights of people who get into trouble with the law") than
did low-dogmatic subjects. Mitchell and Byrne (1973) found that
under certain conditions high authoritarian jurors felt more certain of
the guilt of the defendent and recommended more severe punishment.
Case and Lingerfelt (1974), in a study of the effect of professional
training on diagnostic judgements, concluded that increased training
and experience were positively associated with the tendency to apply
negative labels. Thus, preliminary evidence suggests that certain
personality characteristics and the training and experience of the
labeler may systematically affect the labeling outcome.
Several recent studies have been undertaken to assess the
extent to which labeler related variables aid in the explanation of
labeling discrepancies with respect to the anti-social behavior of
children. The original hypotheses in these studies asserted that
labeler variables such as authoritarianism, Machiavellianism,
cognitive complexity, professional training, and general expectancies
would be systematically related to labeling descrepancies.
The
findings supported the hypotheses in several instances. Specifically,
it appears that professional training (Gingerich, et al, 1976), specific
training in the labeling task, and labeler expectancies (Gingerich, et
al, 1977; Gingerich, 1975) are related to the accuracy of behavioral
labeling. Further, the authoritarism of the labeler also seems to be
associated with labeling discrepancies (Gingerich, 1975). Thus, there
is some additional evidence to suggest that variables related to the
labeler, as well as the labelee and the labeling situation, contribute to
our understanding of the labeling process in interpersonal relations.
Along with the labeler variables mentioned above, some of the
more standard variables such as the race, social status, and prior
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record of the labelee were included. Although these variables were
expected to be moderately associated with labeling discrepancies,
such was not the case. While these findings were not inconsistent
with some of the prior research which showed little or no relationship
between status characteristics and official labeling when offense is
held constant (Reiss, 1971; Black and Reiss, 1970; Black, 1970),
additional analysis was unrertaken to determine if any alternative
explanations might emerge.
The Nomothetic Assumption in Labeling
The original design and analysis of the research set out to
predict labeling discrepancies for all labelers as a group. (Gingerich,
1975) That is, it was assumed that the same variables (e.g., social
status, race, prior labeling) would be useful in explaining
discrepancies for all labelers and that the direction and magnitude of
their influence would be essentially similar across all labelers. In the
course of the post hoc analyses, however, it became clear that this
assumption was not warranted. To the contrary, the data suggested
that different labelers were influenced by different variables in
different ways in their interpersonal labeling. Thus, it appeared that
several (but not all) labelers were influenced by subjects' race, but
whereas one labeler saw blacks as more anti-social than they were,
another saw whites as more anti-social than they were. The grouped
analyses, which examined the effect of subjects' race for all labelers
together, failed to show this relationship apparently because the
opposite effects of race for the two labelers cancelled each other
out. A similar situation obtained with subjects' social status and prior
labeling; both variables were influential for some labelers, but in
different ways. Thus, the post hoc empirical analyses suggested that,
although some variables are not significantly related to interpersonal
labeling when averaged across a group of labelers, they may have
significant relationships for individual labelers taken separately. This
research provided additional support, then, for the possibility that
labeling outcomes are influenced in part by labeler related variables.
Perhaps more importantly, it also suggested that the effects of
labeler related variables were somewhat unique or idiographic to each
labeler. Although existing labeling theory could accomodate the
earlier finding rather easily, it seemed to make no provision for the
possibility
that
different
labelers
functioned
differently.
Consequently, ti seemed important to try to develop a more adequate
theoretical formulation of interpersonal labeling, focusing more on
the labeler and his or her internal cognitive structure. Fortunately,
this topic has received considerable attention within psychology.
What follows, then, is largely an effort to apply existing person
perception theory to labeling theory, hopefully with the result of
enhancing our understanding of labeling processes at at the level of
interpersonal relations.
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A THEORY OF INTERPERSONAL LABELING
The Cognitive Structure
The discussion which follows takes the view that interpersonal
labeling is one form of perception in general, and person perception in
particular. In addition, interpersonal labeling is viewed largely as an
internal process; thus, the focus is primarily on what goes on inside
the labeler as contrasted with variables in the external world.
A useful model of the perceptual process, called the "lens
model", has been developed by Egon Brunswik (1952, 1956) and is
shown graphically in Figure 1. The distal stimulus refers to the
labelee, his characteristics and behaviors. The second component is
the cognitive structure of the labeler. The cognitive structure
contains the concepts or hypotheses which, according to rules of
cognitive structure
(labeler)

0
0
0
0
distal
stimulus
(labelee)

0
0
0

terminal
stimulus
(the "label")

Figure 1. The lens model of the labeling
process. Adapted from Brunswik (1952).
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combination, are used to classify or categorize the cues given off by
the labelee. The final component of the lens model refers to the
outcome of the labeling process, the label itself. To summarize, the
cues given off by the initial stimulus (the labelee) are attended to and
processed according to the cognitive structure of the labeler, with
the outcome that the stimulus is or is not labeled as an instance of
the category.
The lens model of interpersonal labeling places primary
emphasis on the labeler and his or her cognitive structure. This is in
marked contrast to the usual emphasis in interpersonal labeling
theory on the status characteristics of the labelee. But while the lens
model is a useful heuristic of the labeling process, it leaves
unspecified the nature of the cognitive structure, the concepts or
categories it contains, and the rules of combination employed.
The Category System. One aspect of the cognitive structure
which is of primary importance for understanding interpersonal
labeling is the category system of the labeler (Lofland, 1969).
A
category consists of a class or group of people or things which are
similar in one or more ways. Categories are defined by their criteria
or bases for membership. Specifically, categories of people may be
formed on the basis of one or more of three kinds of criteria: the
attributes (e.g., race, sex, age) or behavior (e.g., demeanor, dress) of
the labelee or the behavior of others toward the labelee (e.g., arrest,
commitment, scapegoating).
Categories vary according to the number and configuration of
the criteria which define them. This is sometimes loosely referred to
as the objectivity or subjectivity of the category or the degree to
which it is directly observable. Theoretically, categories defined by
relatively few and directly observable cues (e.g., height, sex) should
be subject to less labeling error than more complex categories which
require more inferences on the part of the labeler (e.g., aggression,
psychosis). Thus, the characteristics of the category itself will to
some extent determine the accuracy or reliability with which it can
be applied.
Each perceiver or labeler has his or her own system of
categories. Some of these categories may be largely personal and
unique to the labeler, whereas other categories are socially defined
and thus are shared to some extent by other labelers. Further, the
criteria for a given category may be more or less unique to the
individual labeler. For example, while there is some commonality
among labelers on the criteria that define the category "delinquent,"
each individual labeler nevertheless may retain some uniqueness in his
criteria. Theoretically, then, one source of variation in the labeling
process has to do with the particular set of categories the labeler
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employs and the criteria for each category. Both of these factors
may be more or less unique to each individual labeler.
Rules of combination. At some point in the perceptual process,
the labeler combines the cues given off by the labelee to form a
judgement about the labelee, e.g., the labelee is "delinquent". What
is not clear, however, is the way in which labelers combine cues. It
appears that sometimes a linear model (e.g., additive or averaging)
best explains the decision process, but in other cases a configural
(e.g., patterned or Gestalt) model is more explanatory (Warr and
Knapper, 1968).
These differences are reflected in alternative
definitions of deviance: the behavioral definition of delinquency uses
a linear additive model whereas the syndrome definition appears to
use a configural model (Hirschi, 1969).
The relevance of combinational rules for understanding
interpersonal labeling is that different labelers may use different
For example, one labeler may define
rules of combination.
delinquency behaviorially and combine cues in an additive fashion
while another may employ a pattern model as in a syndrome
definition of delinquency. Further, labelers who use a summative
model may use different weights for the various cues, resulting in
differences in the degree of delinquency ascribed to the individual.
Rules of Inference. The rules of inference determine which, if
any, additional categories will be attributed to the labelee (Weldon,
et al, 1975). Lofland (1969) refers to this phenomenon as a clustering
of categories. That labelers do infer additional properties to labelees
is readily seen. For example, if we observe a male youth who is
disrespectful of authority, unruly, and of lower social status or ethnic
minority, we might categorize him as delinquent. If so, the label is
inferred from the presence of other presumable categories, not from
directly observed delinquent acts. It is still unknown whether these
rules of inference follow a logical model or a probabilistic model or
some other less systematic model, or whether individual labelers have
their own unique rules of inference.
The importance of the concept of rules of inference is that it
provides a theoretical explanation for certain kinds of errors in
labeling.
For example, the over-representation of the poor and
minorities in social control institutions may reflect rules of inference
that such individuals are more likely to be deviant, or in the past have
been found to be deviant, rather than the fact that these individuals
Thus, interpersonal mislabeling may reflect
are deviant now.
incorrect rules of inference or too much reliance upon inferences
from related categories rather than direct observation of criteria
relative to the category of interest.
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The foregoing has outlined in highly schematic form the
rudiments of the cognitive structure of the labeler. In addition to
the cognitive structure itself, however, a variety of other factors
may influence interpersonal labeling. Some of these factors influence
the cognitive structure directly whereas others have to do with the
amount and kind of cues emitted by the labelee in the situational
context.
Sources of Variance in Interpersonal Labeling
Experience. No doubt one of the most important influences on
interperso
lbeling is the experience of the labeler, particularly in
the form of training or education. One effect of such experience is
to increase and further specify the category system within the
cognitive structure of the labeler (i.e., the dimensions and degree of
discrimination) and perhaps to specify the rules of combination and
the rules of inference.
This is particularly true in professional
clinical training where considerable emphasis is placed upon
classification systems and the indicants or criteria for diagnoses.
Thus, for example, the clinical psychologist has a highly developed
cognitive structure regarding categories within the referential
domain "psychopathologies" whereas the lay person does not. This is
not to say, however, that there is high agreement between
psychologists as to the criteria or rules of combination for categories
such as schizophrenia or character disorder (Stuart, 1970). Nevertheless, theoretically it should be possible to train for a high level of
agreement and, consequently, relatively high reliability in the
application of the category.
Personality Traits. Another potential source of variability in
the labeling process is the relatively stable personality traits of the
labeler. Three such traits which might be expected to influence
labeling are authoritarianism, dogmatism and cognitive complexity.
Authoritarian or dogmatic labelers may make less accurate
judgements because their need for clarity and certainty may lead to
premature closure in the labeling process (Adorno, et al, 1950; 3ones,
1954; Steffesmeier, 1974). Authoritarianism or dogmatism would be
expected to influence labeling only to the extent that not all relevant
data are immediately present and easily combined to reach a
judgement. Cognitively complex labelers have more dimensions in
their cognitive structure and the ability to make finer discriminations
along those dimensions, thus they would be expected to be more
accurate in their labeling (Bieri, et a, 1966; Bieri, 1961).
The
influence of cognitive complexity would be moderated to the extent
that training develops or further delineates the cognitive structure of
the labeler. One additional labeler related variable which may be
associated with labeling outcomes is threshold, defined as the
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propensity to attribute behaviors to subjects based upon limited
information (Reed and Jackson, 1975).
Motivational Factors. Different categories within the cognitive
structure may have different salience for the labeler.
These
differences may in turn affect the outcome of the labeling process.
The hypothesis-testing theory of perception advanced by Bruner (1951,
1957) and Postman (1951) provides a model for incorporating
motivational effects on the labeling outcome. According to this
theory, perception is a three-phase process.
It begins with a
hypothesis (in the cognitive structure of the labeler) that influences
not only what the labeler sees but also what he looks for. Next, the
labeler takes in and processes cues from the distal stimulus relevant
to the perceptul hypothesis. Finally, the labeler seeks to determine
whether the distal stimulus confirms the hypothesis, that is, whether
it is an instance of deviance.
If so, the perceptual process is
concluded. If not, the hypothesis is revised according to the learning
that took place in the "trial-and-check" phase, and the entire process
is repeated until a stable percept or label is formed.
Perceptual hypotheses might be thought of as labeling
hypotheses of the labeler which "serve to select, organize and
transform the stimulus information that comes from the
environment" (Postman, 1951: 250).
They develop from past
experience and their strength is a function of several determinants:
(1) the frequency of past confirmation, (2) monopoly - the fewer
competing hypotheses, the stronger the present one will be, (3)
cognitive consequences - the more consistent with theory, the
stronger it will be, (4) personal consequences - the extent to which
the hypothesis reflects the goals of the labeler, and (5) social
consequences - the extent to which a given hypothesis is in
agreement with the hypotheses of other labelers. According to
Bruner, the stronger the perceptual hypothesis, the greater the
likelihood that it will become aroused and therefore influence the
labeling process. Further, less congruent information will be required
to confirm it and more contradictory information will be necessary to
refute it.
The significance of the hypothesis-testing theory of perception
is clear. When one is trained to see deviance, is paid to identify and
treat it, has seen it often, and is reinforced personally or by
colleagues for identifying it, the likelihood increases that one might
"see" or label deviance that has little or no objective basis.
The Situational Context. The social ecology of the labeling
interaction can also influence the outcome. The most obvious effect
has to do with the availability of cues. For example, to what extent
does the context restrict access to the relevant cues. Within certain
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limits, the more information the more accurate the judgement can
be. A positive kind of situational influence comes from the demand
characteristics present in the environment (Orne, 1969). Factors such
as organizational or policy constraints may require the labeler to use
certain categories or apply them according to predefined ways. This
may be particularly true in social control processing agencies such as
the courts where operating procedures may have a major impact on
labeling. In fact, the presumed over-riding effect of organizations'
operating procedures may in part account for the disregard of the
individual labeler in labeling outcomes. The influence of others
present in the environment may also bring pressure on the labeler to
make an inaccurate judgement, as in Asch's (1952) well-known studies
of impression formation. The effect of the environmental context in
conjunction with the behavior of the labelee is explicitly taken into
account in attribution theory (Jones, et al, 1972; Kelley, 1973). Here
the emphasis is upon the person-situation pattern of cues and its
effect on perception, particularly the attribution of causality for the
actor's behavior.
The Emergent Interaction.
One additional and potentially
significant source of variation in interpersonal labeling relates to the
emergent aspects of the labelee-labeler interaction itself. The
labeling process is a situational, dynamic and highly interactive
process (Prus, 1975).
In actual interactions, labelees are also
labelers, and labelers are labelees.
Thus, each influences the
symbolic and labeling processes of the other, over and above the
cognitive structures that had pre-existed, in ways that no doubt are
real but are essentially unpredictable. The implication of this is that
while it may be possible to improve considerably our understanding of
interpersonal labeling processes, it will never be possible to predict a
priori the specific outcomes with complete accuracy.
CONCLUSION
In contrast to the usual emphasis on labelee characteristics and
organizational processing, the present paper has focused on the
labeler as an equally important influence on labeling outcomes
Specifically, attention has focused upon the cognitive structure and
processes within the labeler that may affect interpersonal labeling.
While much of the theory and research on labeler influences
originated in social psychology, there seems to be no inherent
problem in incorporating it into labeling theory. Rather, it appears
that the labeler, and particularly the internal processes occurring
within the labeler, was simply overlooked in most labeling theory.
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In addition to the importance of the labeler generally in
predicting outcomes, there is growing evidence that individual

labelers differ in how and on what bases they label others. Some of
the dimensions along which labelers might be expected to be unique
are suggested, but the specific ways in which labelers differ is still
largely a matter of speculation.
The implications of the above are several. First, investigations
of labeling, particularly at the level of interpersonal relations, must
attend to the sources of variance related to the labeler. Thus, while
it may be important to consider status characteristics of the labelee
and other situational factors, it is likely that the effects of such
external variables will in turn be moderated or influenced in some
way by each labeler. Although these suggestions recall the longstanding idiographic versus nomothetic controversy (Allport, 1962),
there is already some precedent for incorporating individual
differences in predicting labeling outcomes and, indeed, such an
approach gives promise of enhancing considerably our understanding
of labeling processes.
NOTES

IThe approach taken in this paper assumes the positivist view
that deviance and labeling are two independent but related processes;
that is, an act can be categorized as deviant on the basis of
predetermined, agreed-upon criteria which are independent of
immediate social reactions. Thus, Lemert (1951) talks about the
warranted portion of the social reaction, and Scheff (1974) refers to
the magnitude of societal reactions that are independent of the
patient's psychiatric condition. While this view of deviance and
labeling is counter to the subjective or phenomenological view taken
by other labeling theorists (Quinney, 1970; Lofland, 1969), the
investigation of the differential application of deviant labels
necessarily presupposes some objective standard of deviant or
potentially deviant behavior. For a more thorough discussion of the
issue of warrant in labeling theory, see the recent article by Rains
(1975).
2Arthur D. Shulman was instrumental in suggesting alternative
hypotheses and methods of statistical analysis of the data.
3

Space limitations permit only a highly selective and simplified
presentation of the relevant theory and research in the area of person
perception. For a more thorough review which is more cognizant of
the subtleties and complexities of the perceptual aspects in
interpersonal labeling, the reader is referred to Weldon, et al. (1975).
General sources on person perception include Bruner and Tagiuri

(1954), Hastorf, et al (1970), Jones, et al (1972), and Tagiuri (1%9).
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ABSTRACT
The historic concept of "friendly visitor" has blurred the distinction of professional and personal in worker/client relationships.
Current social trends and social problems as well as recent theory
applications in practice have made these distinctions harder to
identify and maintain. Role theory can be used to analyze behavioral
indicators of objective and subjective components of relationship.

Relationship Revisited
In social work no term has been used more frequently, l but less
defined, 2 than relationship. Mary Richmond, in Social Diagnosis, did
not deal directly with the concept and only hinted at it in arguing
that the purpose of the sqcial worker is to influence and to know the
client in order to serve.
More recently, Halmos has described this
as the worker using his "personality to find out, to understand, and
to learn."" Prior to and during the period of Richmond's work, the
concept "friendly visitor" was used instead of relationship. The
association of the terms friendship and relationship led to confusion
about what constituted a professional relationship. The confusing
association persists and is epitomized by Boyer's statement that the
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professional self necessitates the worker becoming "a friend to the
client, but not a friend of the client.'" Freud, soon after publication of Richmond's Social Diagnosis, began to influence the practice
of social work in this country, and one of his major efforts was to
objectify the relationship between the worker and client. Later Otto
Rank influenced social work practice through the work of the "functionalists" which subjectified relationship and made it the center
and purpose of social work practice. To this day, workers trained in
this theoretical model speak of all social work practice in the context of relationship as opposed to the "diagnostic
school" which views
6
relationship as a tool in good practice.
All the writings since have been an attempt to balance the objective and subjective components of relationship. Objectivity implies
the worker not losing sight of factors such as client needs, problems,
resources, and motivations while working to ameliorate weaknesses in
psycho-social functioning. Subjectivity, on the other hand, has been
characterized as the worker acting out his personal values, needs, and
motivations to focus on factors more significant to him than the client. In this context, Hamilton views professional relationships not
as just friendly associations, but controlled ehavior towards the end
of serving the psycho-social needs of clients.
Biestik defines relationship in terms of its purpose in helping the client achieve better
adjustment between himself and his environment.8 Perlman argues that,
upon entering social work, the worker is required to face up to relationship for the first time. For her, professional relationship involvgs two persons with some common interest who interact with feeling.
Perlman goes on to discuss professional relationship through
drawing examples from ordinary human interactions. Without defining
relationship as such, Hollis describes it as a means of communication,
a set of attitudes, and a set of responses expressed as behavior. She
places emphasis on the worker's positive involvement to promote continued commitment on the part of the client while ar~uing that a bland
uninvolved attitude leads to client discontinu4nce. "u In elaborating
on attitudes, she draws on the work of Garrett'' and makes the distinction of realistic and unrealistic. These concepts are explained
as appropriate and inappropriate reactions to the situation on the
part of the client and the worker that contain elements of transference and countertransference.
Recent writers have not deviated much from these earlier conceptions except to place more emphasis on objectivity as a crucial component of relationship. This is probably due to increased emphasis on
the scientific approach to and professionalization of practice. The
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emphasis on the concept of objectivity in relationship is illustrated
by the reylated us@ 3of the term.jn one form or another in the writing
of Brill," Boyer,
Goldstein,1' Pincus and Minahan,l o Kadushin, m6
The trendin conceptualizing relationship has been in
and Siporin.l
the area of viewing it as special and identifying the uniqueness,
while at the same time recognizing the common characteristics that
are shared with other forms of human relationship. Social work relationships are generally viewed as purposeful, client-need oriented,
time limited, honest, genuine and realistic, and unequal. The element
of inequality serves as the basis for heavy emphasis on objectivity
which is usually discussed as the degree of involvement or professional distance the worker must appropriately maintain. All of the
above-mentioned commentators on relationship approach the subject from
the standpoint of professional objectivity and use the term specifically except Kadushin, who discusses the same ,rinciple but uses the
The integration of
alternate term of "disciplined subjectivity."
aspects of professional relationship with objectivity is perceived as
accomplishing the purpose of the relationship by the worker maintaining objectivity and stability through " . . a certain degree of
emotional and social distance, and a greater degree of authority and
than is expected of
and self-discipline . .
control, se-awareness
"
the client. 6
The purpose of this paper is to explore, through empirical
referents and the use of the sociological concept of role distance,
appropirate degrees of objectivity in social work professional relationships. Using the perspective of sociological role theory to explain relationship, the specific concept of role distance is applied
to what does and should take place between worker and client. In
recent literature, social workers have been attempting to apply
various theories of human behavior to practice. In this effort,
relationship is rarely discussed in connection with these theories.
The trend, intended or unintended, is to discuss separately relationship and application of theory to practice. This paper is an attempt
to discuss relationship within the context of a theoretical perspective. Role theory is used because of its emphasis on the varying
abilities and capabilities participants bring to a role, and their
own unique interpretation of the role which determines their style of
interaction. Role theory places emphasis on expectations evident in
micro social units, and it ultimately attempts to account for types
of role performance by individuals.lu
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Role Theory and Relationship
The smallest unit of social structure is a norm which is required
or acceptable behavior for a given interactional situation. Norms
provide standards for behavior as well as standards for judging behavior. 2 1 Roles are clustered subsets of norms that refer to expecta2
tions for individuals who hold a particular position in a group.
Roles assume relationship since every role presumes some counterrole. 2 3 The term role has been differentiated as conventional roles
dealing with broad, structural conceptions of everyday performance,
and interpersonal roles that define unique human interaction in specific roles and the resulting expectations. Interpersonal roles will
be the focus of our analysis of the worker/client relationship. Kinch
has described relationship as parallel to Cooley's formulation of primary and secondary groups. 24 Primary relationships involve an atmosphere in which involved individuals exchange initimate knowledge, act
and react with some degree of spontaneity, and provide realistic conceptions of themselves and what others expect of them. Primary relationships possess an element of quality and involve a degree of unique
emotional attachment. Secondary relationships are based on a necessity of cooperation that exists for the fulfillment of aims or goals of
the individual participants. Secondary relationships usually involve
interaction of short duration with little emotional or personal involvement. Social workers engage in both types of relationships.
Depending upon the setting and how the situation is defined, some
workers engage exclusively in primary or secondary relationships,
while other practitioners alternate between the two forms. A paraprofessional, food-stamp interviewer in a welfare department engages
exclusively in secondary relationships with clients, while a psychotherapist in private practice is more likely to develop only primary
relationships with patients. A caseworker in a welfare department or
a mental health clinic is found to use both types, depending upon the
situation. Frequently, workers who only have brief contact with clients mistakenly minimize the importance of relationship, while social
workers who interact with clients over long periods of time tend to
overemphasize the importance of relationship.
Primary social work relationships can be associated more with
psychotherapeutic efforts to change personality and patterns of social
relations, while secondary relationships deal more with provision of
concrete, tangible services. Both types involve varying emotional,
temporal, and structural elements. The emotional element is best conceptualized as having objective and subjective components that determine the degree of authenticity which has been described by Levitsky
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25
and Simkin as a "State of individuation, of truly being one's self."
Authenticity can be operationalized as the appropriate role blending
of objectivity and subjectivity through professional closeness and professional distance. In the objective mode, the worker maximizes professional closeness and personal distance, while in the subjective
mode, personal closeness and professional distance are maximized.
Using such a framework for relationship, we have the basis for distinguishing helping relationships and other ordinary and extraordinary
relationships. So that the objective quality of a practitioner's
professional relationship will set the tone of interaction with a
troubled client which will differ from the conversation that might
take place with a similarly troubled relative. The social worker
might feel more competent in the former, but much less comfortable in
the latter.

Role Embracement, Role Distance,
and Relationship
The relevant degrees of objectivity and subjectivity in professional relationships are difficult to assess and are highly variable
given the nature, quality, structure, and duration of the relationship. The problem can be approached from the concepts of norms, roles,
and role distance. Social workers are trained to perform according to
certain norms, and there are professional expectations regarding role
performance. The social worker is expected to treat the client with
dignity and respect, accept his right to self-determination, insure
his confidentiality, guarantee his privacy, and not judge his behavior.
In the role of social worker, the practitioner is to demonstrate
warmth and acceptance, show interest and understanding, be genuine,
and intervene at a level appropriate to the client's needs. These expectations are not necessarily associated with subjective relationships.
All of us enter personal relationships where we do not make pledges of
confidentiality or privacy, do not show understanding, do not act genuine, and do not directly intervene. So that objective relationships
frequently demand more of us than subjective relationships in terms of
performance and involvement. A crucial question in an objective relationship becomes: how much of the self are we going to make available
to the situation? Goffman refers to this as role embracement and explains that, "To embrace a role is to disappear completely into the
virtual self available in the situation, to be fully seen in terms of
the image, and to confirm expressively ogg's acceptance of it. To
embrace a role is to be embraced by it."'"
Objectivity is expressed
in many forms in social work training to regulate the degree to which
the worker embraces the social work roq so that the norm against
"over-identification" is not violated;
but in theory, this is more
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easily described than it is attained in practice. Goffman calls this
expressed separateness between the individual and his role, role distnce. The person performs the role but uses certain behaviors to
control and limit the extent to which the role is embraced. The extreme of this formulation would be the social worker who is attached
to or assigned the role and fails to embrace it, such as the social
worker who conceives himself as a warm, loving, giving person, but who
Role distance is mainis actually cold, rejecting, and destructive. l
tained through such behaviors as nonchalant competence, style of dress,
diverting conversation, making jokes, and acting visibly bored. At
the other extreme, professional subjectivity is that aspect of social
work practice that finds the worker losing sight of his function and
professional role and expectations to the extent that his own needs,
concerns, and desires enter into the relationship at an inappropriate
level.
While it has not been discussed as such, professional role distance has been a subject of concern in recent literature. Writers
have been pointing to more active involvement on the part of the worker to promote change in clients as opposed to the more detached worker
emphasized in the Freudian conception. The shift has been away from
the traditional interpretative model where the aloof worker offers
interpretation, insight, and comment, to an experiential model where
the worker is actively engaged in the growth and change process. This
new conception has been emerging without concomitant development of
adequate behavioral referent for the worker to use as an assessment
measure of appropriate level of "making the self available to the
situation." Stebbins, building on the work of Goffman, has developed
that
the dichotomous distinction of "major and minor role distance"
can be helpful in determining appropriate levels of objectivity in
social work practice. Major role distance refers to the attitudes and
behaviors that occur in highly threatening situations, while minor
role distance develops in moderately or slightly threatening situations. In a major role distance posture, the worker can respond with
professional detachment, or go to the other extreme of total involvement and take over by relating the situation to himself. A worker's
account of his response to a patient's statement of suicidal threat
in a group treatment situation involving seven depressed patients
illustrates a possible differentiation of major and minor role distance:
Near the close of this group session, Mary said she
again felt the desire to do away with herself. These
same kind of feelings had perviously resulted in her
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hospitalization. She felt that a re-hospitalization would not help, refused to consider that as a
possibility, and admitted that during her last
hospitalization, she had to struggle against taking
a razor blade and slashing her wrists while on a
weekend visit home. She was overwrought because
she felt 'going back to the hospital would not help
and nothing was going to change at home.' The
group members were at a loss to help Mary. The
group seemed to be looking to me to say or do something. I remember feeling like saying, 'You know,
there is a strong possibility Mary will do away
with herself before we meet again next week. We
might not ever see her again. I hope this is not
the case, but it could happen. Does anybody want
to say anything to Mary in case we don't see her
again?' What I have learned about working to keep
people from doing harm to themselves and others prevented me from acting on my true feelings, and the
only genuine recourse I felt I had in the situation.
My values and feelings were in conflict. Instead
of acting on my feelings, I feebly encouraged Mary
by saying, 'See you next week!'
In this situation, the worker engaged in major role distance to
deal with a highly threatening situation. If the worker could have
moved to a minor role distance position and acted on the authentic
feelings of the professional self, it is possible that the entire
situation could have been restructured to the point other group members would have been able to express concern for the patient and
demonstrate that there was genuine regard and caring for her.
Within major and minor role distance, Stebbins identifies the subcategories of true and false role distance behavior. In true role
distance behavior, the expectations are genuinely disliked and expressed, while in false role distance behavior, the actor attempts to
create the impression he disapproves when he is actually attracted to
the expectations. 30 So that a true role distance would be appropriate
when a child-abusing client seeks approval of such behavior from the
worker. The worker is put in a more difficult position in false role
distance when, for example, a young marijuana user seeks the sanction
of the worker. When the worker has been or is a marijuana user, false
role distancing becomes an issue, because frequently, the client's
expectations are sought as approval through asking the worker, "Do you
do drugs?" If the worker admits to past drug usage, he is fearful of
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becoming too identified with the client, and if he denies drug use,
he takes the risk of being rejected or dismissed as being "straight"
and unable to understand. Appropriate false role distance involves
expressing to the client serious concern about heavy drug dependence,
and at the same time, communicating acceptance of and concern for the
drug-dependent client. This form of role conflict is especially found
among paraprofessional drug counselors since the clients and workers
are alike in age, cultural backgound, and developmental life struggles.
False role distancing is frequently appropriate in social work
relationships but often hard to maintain. As inflation-induced deprivation increases,societal alienation spreads, and bureaucratic complexity promotes frustration and confusion, the worker frequently
experiences many of the same problems encountered and articulated by
the client, opening the way for the worker to totally embrace the
role and join in intellectualizing the negative aspects of modern
society rather than constructively using the relationship to promote
change and growth that benefits both client and worker. The following
case record excerpt illustrates this point:
During the initial interview, Jane described how she
thought she was taking the right step by divorcing her
husband of eight years. She had struggled through
college while caring for a family and received much
opposition from her husband, who held no value for
education. Upon finishing college, she realized she
and her husband had 'grown apart' and had seen this
coming for a long time. She became depressed when she
could not get a job and upon applying for many jobs,
she was required to take a typing test. Interviewers
frequently offered her jobs far below her qualifications and salary requirements to support herself and
her children. She became so frustrated she 'stormed
out' of an interview yesterday and cried all night
before coming here today, submerged in regrets and a
feeling of failure. As the session progressed, I
found myself emotionally withdrawing from the room.
It was a really strange feeling until I suddenly
realized I had gone through a similar stage myself
and was responding to seeing my recent past experience in this person. I reflected upon some of the
similar interviews I had in seeking a social work
position. At first I felt like just unloading with
all my experiences and joining her in attacking the
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system and its treatment of women, thought better
of it, composed myself, and simply stated I understood before telling her I could work with her
around organizing the job-hunting efforts. I asked
her to bring her resume to the next appointment and
assured her I could provide help in how to handle
interviews where her qualifications were not appropriately recognized by potential employers. I did
share that I had a similar experience and was able
to resolve it with help. She expressed relief and
renewed hope.
In this situation, the worker avoided total role embracement, consciously injected objectivity into her role, and engaged in minor false role
distance in order to be effective in helping the client.
Role distance in professional relationships generally takes three
forms: attitudes, expectations, and behaviors. Using these three
areas in connection with major/minor and true/false role distance, relationships can be analyzed and worker/client interaction assessed.
Attitudes, expectations and behaviors are interrelated and influence
each other. Verbal expressions of workers that reflect attitudes and
expectations can be used to indicate role distance. For example, some
worker comments we have observed from interview content analysis are:
"If I were in your shoes, I am not sure I would feel that way"; "Let
me try to set aside my values for a minute"; "You have had it rougher
than me, but . . . "; "If you want my professional opinion . . . ";
and, "What you described is common among people who have drinking
problems." Language itself is a social act, and these examples, in one
way or another,convey to a client a certain role distance recognized
by the worker; but at the same time, the first three statements indicate efforts to contract or expand the role distance to relate more
directly to the client and his problem. Extreme statements of role
distance are expressed by some workers in the absence of the client
and demonstrate the attitudes as well as the expectations of the worker: "You really can't do anything for these people [clients], because
they don't want to do anything for themselves," or "You have to start
with the premise that they [clients] all lie, then you will be okay."
There is no role embracement here, and one can picture easily the
nature of the relationship the worker, who holds these attitudes and
expectations, has with clients.
Behaviors that indicate maximum role distance are placing a desk
between the worker and client, using large rectangular tables for
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groups with the worker sitting at the "head" of the table, an office
full of bookcases with texts on the shelves, having the client sent
or brought to the interview room, placing degrees on the office wall,
and use of last names. Behaviors that lessen role distance are worker
and clients sitting face-to-face without obstacles between them,
greeting clients in the waiting room and personally escorting them to
the interview room, use of first names, and conducting interviews in
the client's home. Certain attempts to verbally overcome role distance can have the opposite of the desired effect. The worker who
uses the colloquial and specialized vocabulary and jargon of the client creates an artificiality that can deter development of an effective relationship. Instead, the worker should use ordinary, natural
language that is free of technical and professional terms that might
be meaningless to the client.3' There are indications that natural or
true role distance contributes to the change process. Halmos discusses
this aspect of relationship by calling attention to research in support
of Homans' hypotqsis that interacting individuals tend to become more
alike over time.
If there is to be conscious use of the professional
self to promote change in the client, then the worker must offer the
client a differential model for identification at given points in the
relationship. This view in part deviates from the traditional social
work belief that the more similar the worker is to the client, the
more likely the client is to invest in the relationship. Tessler and
Polansky's research produced results that raise questions about this
traditional view, becage they found that dissimilarity led to greater
verbal accessibility.
From a role theory perspective, we are not
surprised at this finding, and a young,black social worker's comments
illustrate this point:
When I went to work here at the clinic, my supervisor
decided to start me off by giving me all black clients
since, as she put it, 'I could identify the problems
I
more easily and accomplish more in less time."
agreed and really thought it would be so easy for me,
and I was relieved that I didn't have a lot of white
clients to start out with. Well, it was terrible.
It was a mistake. Since I was black, the clients
felt they didn't have to explain anything. They would
get angry because I didn't know exactly what they were
talking about. I even had one client tell me I was
dumb. After awhile, my supervisor realized the problem
.and gave me a mixed caseload; but in the meantime, I
was so frustrated, I almost quit.
If this supervisor and worker would have used role distancing proposi-
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tions to analyze the situation and could have developed some appropriate role distance behaviors, a great deal of frustration could have
been avoided.
Conclusion
It is believed by the authors that a professional relationship
is an essential component and tool in offering aid to clients, but
the worker must come to grips with what Halmos has called "The paradox of a noninvolved involvement. . . ,.34 The concept of role distance has been used to describe what is considered appropriate degrees
of sharing and interaction on the part of the worker. Much study remains in terms of explicating how modern theories of human behavior as
applied to social work practice view relationships. No systematic
comparative analysis of Freudian, Existential, behaviorism, and systems theories has been done with respect to relationship. With the
explosion of diverse human behavior theories, social workers have been
preoccupied matching their practice with theory. Attention needs to
be given to applying and developing these theories by relating them to
practice. We have attempted to do this through use of role theory and
the concept of role distance. Such applications need to be expanded,
especially in the case of role theory, since it lends itself to analysis of worker/client relationships. Additional propositions taken
from role theory such as role conflict (conflicts among expectations),
role strain (impossibility of meeting all expectations), and anomie
(lack of clear expectations) 35 need to be elaborated in the context of
social work practice. Also, the concept of role distance needs to be
studied in relation to client behavior and interaction with the worker.
Comprehensive theoretical applications of this nature can contribute
significantly to further understanding of the social work relationship.
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SOCIAL WELFARE INTEREST GROUPS:
AN UNDERUTILIZED RESOURCE
Fred Barbaro,
Adelphi University School of Social Work

ABSTRACT
This paper addresses the need for increased political activity by the professional social work community in order
to enhance its own status and to promote the growth of the
social welfare institutions required by our clientele.
It
is not a polemic but an attempt to bare the relationship
between social welfare bureaucracies and the political
system. The results of a study on interest group behavior
are reported. Social workers, as an interest group, can
be more effective in advancing the goals of the profession
if they have a better understanding of the political process and thereby maximize the impact of their limited
resources.

Form has noted that there has been an impressive growth in
welfare institutions in America, despite the political reticence of welfare professionals and the political apathy
of their clientele.1 He attributes the growth to worldwide and domestic pressures articulated by many poorly
organized groups that recognized that the existing mechanisms could not address the problems facing society. Once
the bureaucracies were created to administer the programs,
professional social workers validated the services by
training their personnel in schools of social work and by
staffing the agencies but then proceeded to "strike a
neutral pose" in line with traditional norms governing
professional behavior. 2
A contemporary view of social services in an industrial
society equates expanded programs with productivity
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increases, and a rise in living standards.
Services are
not seen as transitory but necessary to the functioning of
a modern society. 3 In this sense they are supportive of
the social and economic order but are nevertheless under
attack by conservative groups that purport to have similar
goals.
In a rapidly expanding economy, social services
may keep abreast of expansion in other areas but during
periods of slow growth or stagnation, they are prime targets for curtailment. Neutrality at that time may be consistent with one's view of professional role but is it
consistent with client need or even professional selfinterest? I think not.
This paper addresses the need for political activity by the
professional community.
It is not a polemic but an attempt
to bare the relationship between social welfare bureaucracies and the political system, and to increase our understanding of the role that interest groups play in the
process. The latter objective is achieved by reporting
the results of a study conducted on social welfare interest
groups. While the professional association has increased
its political activity of late, some observers have expressed the view that the majority of social workers will
not participate. Form shares this view for he believes
that the profession "tends to breed a type that is timid,
conservative, unimaginative, and easily co-opted by the
tough-minded."4 At best this view is impressionistic and
it is important to keep in mind that the same things were
once said about teachers.
Few would now characterize
teachers and their associations as apolitical and there is
no reason to believe that social workers could not change
their image if they were convinced that it was in their
best interest to do so.
A Pluralist Perspective of the Political System
Zald's contribution to a "sociology of community organization" 5 is helpful in demonstrating how agencies shape professional practice and how in turn their activities are
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curtailed by internal and external events. The political
science literature adds to these insights by spelling out
the role of bureaucracies in political decision-making
which not only includes their clientele but other actors
and interest groups as well. From the pluralist's perspective, 6 the bureaucracies share power with other actors
while they continually strive for a state of autonomy. No
single elite dominates the governmental or political system. The system is seen as being vigorously competitive
with numerous contestants vying against one another for the
prizes that are an out-growth of political activity.
Sayre and Kaufman noted that there are a multiplicity of
decision centers consisting of two parts: "A 'core group'
at the center, invested by the rules with the formal
authority to legitimize decisions ....and a constellation of
'satellite groups' seeking to influence the authoritative
issuances of the core group.' 7 Interest groups are satellite groups, in constant competition or in alliances with
each other, pressing their claims on the core groups presiding over the decision centers of the general organs of
government.
Utilizing an example of a welfare department in a large
city, this pluralistic view of decision-making may be
schematically stated as depicted in Figure I.
This paradigm, with a few modifications, can be replicated for other
subsystems of the political system like housing or education. While no single elitist group rules over all these
subsystems, each subsystem attracts its own elites that
specialize in that area of interest. Ordinarily these
elites govern without much interference from outsiders.
However, when a good deal of conflict is generated over a
policy issue, decision-making is opened to public view and
new actors become involved. Political actors may have
legal authority to intervene or exercise their influence
informally. Their roles are modified by the rules of the
system which enhance the competition among them and confer
advantages to some and not to others. The rules include:
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

State and Federal Constitution
State and Federal Agency rules and regulations
State and Federal Court decisions
State and Federal statutes
Customs or informal arrangements.

To maintain a degree of autonomy in this highly competitive
atmosphere, bureaucratic officials seek allies to temper
the intrusion of other actors (especially those in the
executive and legislative branches) in their internal
affairs. Rourke states:
A first and fundamental source of power for administrative agencies in American society is
their ability to attract outside support.
Strength in a constituence is no less an asset
for an American administrator than it is for a
politician, and some agencies have succeeded in
building outside support as formidable as that
of any political organization. The lack of such
support severely circumscribes the ability of an
agency to achieve its goals, and may even threaten
its survival as an organization.9
The clientele of an agency, that is, groups whose interests
are strongly affected by an agency's programslO are natural
sources of support and opposition. Interest groups sometimes prefer to work in the bureaucratic rather than the
legislative arena where they may have less influence.
Bureaucrats also have discretion in administering their
programs due to the ambiguous language of some legislation
and the discretionary powers specifically granted to agency
officials by the legislature. 1 1
Therefore, groups that are
interested in the implementation of programs must have influence at the bureaucratic level.
While the administrative power evolves from technical
knowledge, expertise, and sources other than mobilized interest groups, these groups do provide a unique source of
support. Sharkansky describes interest group aid as follows:
-L

I-

....

First, the group can take a position on an

issue which coincides with a position held by
administrators, but which administrators cannot
take publicly because it would offend their
chief executive or important members of the
legislature. Second, interest groups can support an agency's request for funds or statutory
authority with the executive and the legislature
or can help the agency resist undesirable directives from the executive or the legislature. An
interest group can make an argument and build
public support for a position that cannot be
articulated by an administrator who is currently
"1 2
the target of executive or legislative hostility.
Study Design
A definition of terms is essential before one embarks on a
study of interest groups. According to Truman, an interest
group "refers to any group that, on the basis of one or
more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other
groups in the society for the establishment, maintenance or
enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied by the
shared attitudes. 1 3 This definition is broad and designed
to be consistent with his attempt to explain everything
that happens in the political system in terms of groups.
If "shared attitudes" become the significant criteria, then
everyone can be theoretically affiliated with an interest
group - government officials, elected leaders, the unorganized, and the like.
Eckstein calls this approach to the study of political
behavior metaphysical:
As used by its more extravagant exponents, group
theory tends indeed to come nothing more than a
language, based on the plausible but arbitrary
metaphysic that in politics the ultimate "real",
the component alike of individuals and institutions,
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the unit which really "acts" and underlies
ideas, is the group - not individuals,
interactions, institutions, or larger political systems. Nothing can escape the
clutches of this metaphysics if only one
stretches it far enough, but precisely
because of 14this nothing is illuminated by
it either.
Schattschneider agrees with this assessment and attempts to
set boundaries or limit the scope of the subject in order
to distinguish it from other subjects. He begins by differentiating between public and special interests. The
former "refers to general or common interests shared by
all or by substantially all members of the community.15
This is consistent with the "community of interest" thesis,
a requirement of a democratic society.
The implication of
special interests is that only a few people or a faction of
the community share that interest.1 6 If this distinction
is not made and attempts are made to explain everything in
terms of special interests, the subject loses its boundaries and could lead to the conclusion that people have a
special interest in the public interest.
The next step is to limit the subject even further.
Schattschneider suggests that the field of study should be
the organized, special interest groups and "leave the rest
to someone else". 17 The advantages of this approach are
obvious; they are known, identifiable and recognized and
they are all exclusive. The study of the subject becomes
manageable if the researcher focuses on those groups with
a demnstrated interest in politics evidenced by formal
organizations having memberships, bylaws and officers.
This view does not attempt to explain all political
behavior nor does it assume that all interests are articulated. Pressure group politics "makes sense only as the
political instrument of a segment of the community. It
gets results by being selective and biased; if everyone
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got into the act the unique advantages of this form of organization would be destroyed, for it is possible that if
all interests could be mobilized the results would be a
stalemate. "18
It is possible to further refine the definition of interest groups by distinguishing them from pressure groups
and attempting to classify them by objective characteristics or by shared attitudes. This exercise may prove productive in other studies but not this one. The focus suggested by Schattschneider - the formally organized, special
interest group - was the unit of observation in this study.
Arriving at a definition of interest groups, it now became
necessary to observe their political activity. The years
between 1968 and 1972 in New York City were chosen.
Four
issues with educational and broad social welfare concerns
were selected and each conflict was contested in a different arena (e.g., the legislature, the courts). The
issues remained on the public agenda for a long period of
time, thereby giving groups an opportunity to become involved if they chose to do so.
In keeping with Schattschneider's suggestion, the interest
groups chosen for study had the following characteristics:
1. They were formally organized and exhibited a degree
of stability and cohesiveness over time (at least
one year). Ad hoc groups were not considered.
2. They all demonstrated an interest in the issues
based on past behavior.
3. They were citywide organizations.
In all, nineteen organizations 19 were chosen that could be
categorized as civic, educational, religious, civil rights,
ethnic or economic groups. Some would fit comfortably
under more than one designation. Attempts were made to
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get a broad representation of organizations, but it is not
known if they are truly representative of all interest
groups in the city. If the selection of a representative
sample was attempted, important groups who were intimately
involved in the incidents being studied may have been
eliminated.
The data were gathered from interviews with the staffs of
the interest groups which usually involved more than a
single visit to each agency and more than one staff member
being interviewed. In addition, interviews were conducted
with businessmen, staff members of public agencies, union
officials, lobbyists, attorneys, city employees, and members of the state legislature. An unstructured open-ended
schedule was used.
Additional data were gathered by reviewing agency reports, memoranda, pamphlets, and press
releases.
Questions
Questions that were explored in the study include:
Do interests inevitably lead to political activity? Under
what circumstances do groups become involved or refrain
from becoming involved in issues? What are the determining
factors that lead groups to work in one decision-making
arena as opposed to others? Why do some groups specialize
while others choose targets of opportunity? What is the
nature of their relationship with other groups and how does
the new association affect their autonomy? What tactics do
groups use to gain access to decision-makers and decisionmaking centers? With what frequency and degree of intensity? What factors determine the tactics? Is the activity
of any group roughly proportional to its stake in the issue?
Do economic groups tend to promote their interests with
greater intensity and frequency than ideological groups?
Findings
A summary of the findings follows:
-425-

Determinants of Interest Group Activity
Table I lists the nineteen interest groups and their involvement or lack of involvement in the four incidents
studied. Involvement here is judged to be significant
activity. Effectiveness is not a criterion, but a press
release or letter to a legislator is not enough to qualify.
A quick glance at the table suggests certain patterns developing. Only half the groups were' involved in any one
of the incidents under study. But these are not significant factors in themselves, and additional probing is
It is clear, hownecessary to give meaning to the table.
ever, that no one factor determined the course of participation for all groups, and the decision to become involved
or to refrain from such involvement was based on many
factors that will be explored below.
Economic interests engendered a stronger response than
educational or civil rights concerns among the interest
groups.
A case could be made for almost all groups having an equal
stake in the issues based on their professed aims as organizations. But obviously intervening factors curbed
the activities of some of the groups. Nevertheless, the
economic groups overcame the barriers barring participation
of other groups and made it their business to become
involved.
Interest groups intervention is determined by the nature of
the issue as perceived by the group and a desire to maintain a consistent organizational self-image.
One of the factors that depressed activity was the nature
of the issue. If conflict was inevitable, and disruption
possible, and the issue is perceived in that manner, some
groups remain on the sidelines. They do so for the
following reasons:
First, there is the problem of controversy.
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Some groups

established themselves as alternatives to conflict groups
and resist all pressures to become "militant" or take a
stand on controversial issues. They feel that their effectiveness is compromised when they are perceived by their
target groups as being controversial.
Their aim is to gain
concessions from the system as it is and to take advantage
of the changes brought about by other groups.
Second, there are groups that are not repulsed by controversy as such but who have few of the tools with which to
affect the outcome of a contest. This is not a matter of
resources but a choice of operating styles.
Internal conflict over an issue limits both an organization's ability to respond and the intensity of its activity.
The amount of organizational resources had little impact on
a group's decision to become involved in an issue.
Resources are generally considered to be a major determinant of interest group activity. But the evidence here indicates that the lack of resources had little impact on the
decision to enter or not to enter the fray.
Intensity of activity is determined by whether a group is a
single purpose or multi-purpose organization and whether
its posture is defensive or offensive.
Single purpose and multi-purpose groups could be seen as
synonyms for primary and secondary interests, and in a
sense they are. However, the concept of objective interest
as opposed to perceived interest comes into play. Objectively most of the groups had a primary interest in the
issue, but they did not all see it that way. Those organizations that perceive the issue as one of many curtailed their activity, and the intensity with which they
participated accordingly.
Intensity of activity is also related to whether groups
are offensive or defensive. The defensive groups felt
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they were under attack and protected their interests in
every arena.
The choice of arenas by interest groups is determined by
an organization's operating style and its desire not to
break with traditional roles; the dominance of one professional group with its selective perspective on issues and
strateqies; and lack of leadership sophistication in more
than one arena.
Interest Group Tactics
The choice of tactics is directly related to a group's influence in the political system as well as other factors
like leadership sophistication, organizational style, rules
of the arena, and resources.
Many of the factors that determined group involvement in
particular arenas have a bearing on the tactics used by
groups. An organization will use tactics that are consistent with its self-image. The lack of resources will eliminate some options. Some arenas will curb the use of
tactics that are acceptable in other arenas.
And leadership sophistication will account for the variety and
effectiveness of the tactics used.
Over the years some groups have developed relationships
with governmental bodies that have resulted in consultation
rights. These groups by and large do not feel estranged
from the system. But the sixties saw the introduction of
new groups to the political system whose interests were not
always represented before. These groups did not share the
confidence implied by the behavior of other groups regarding the system's responsiveness. Therefore, their tactics
were designed to gain access to decision centers barred to
them in the past or to attempt structural changes that
would not perpetuate their inferior political status.
In response to the civil rights street demonstrations,
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government provided the resources to enable new groups to
be formed, thus revealing a sometimes overlooked relationship between interest groups and decision-making centers.
Interest groups are instrumental in establishing new
policies and new policies lead to the formation of new
interest groups.
Non-governmental interest groups do not constitute a
countervailing force to governmental interest groups.
The non-governmental interest groups were not a significant
political force on major issues. Although they collectively possessed greater resources, they were too fragmented to be effective. As autonomous units they are
Acting alone,
dealt with individually and easily handled.
they are overly conscious of their lack of resources when
seeking to influence amulti-billion dollar agency or a
prestigious legislative body.
The big issues are therefore left to the big actors - the
United Federation of Teachers, the large bureaucracies,
City Hall, and the State Legislature. The blacks and
Puerto Ricans found themselves in this company only because their existing groups coalesced, and they opened up
participation to the unaffiliated. This move gave them
parity in street demonstrations, but they were less
successful in other arenas.
Almost without exception the groups were led by intelligent,
sophisticated people who worked long hours and were committed to organizational goals. They ranged programmatically from those who dabbled in everything to those who
were so planful that they could not react organizationally
The expectation was that each of
to changing situations.
projects that consumed their time and resources
the little
were cumulative and that together they affected larger
policy areas. That conclusion cannot be drawn from the
evidence gathered in this study, but one thing is clear,
non-governmental interest groups did not constitute a
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countervailing force to governmental interest groups,
either in New York City or in Albany. Their activities
can be justified in any number of ways, but the field is
controlled by the big actors.
Conclusion
For our purposes, interest groups can be seen as falling
into the following categories:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Public and private agencies
Social welfare educators
Social welfare professional organizations
Client groups
Groups whose main interest is other than
social welfare

Political activity by social workers usually involves the
first three categories but the latter two are less frequently utilized. The findings in and by themselves do not
offer a blueprint for interest group mobilization, but they
do offer clues concerning their behavior that agency executives can exploit.
This strategy is not without its perils. There is a legitimate concern that control over agency programs or the
appointment of key personnel will be lost in exchange for
interest groups support. Some agency executives have relinquished some control or have granted interest groups
veto power over the appointment of some personnel 2 0 but
the preponderance of evidence indicates that administrators
dominate these relationships. 2 1 While any strategy is
accompanied by risks, inaction can hardly be considered
void of hazards. Year after year aspiring politicians
advance their careers by attacking welfare and social service programs while agency administrators stand alone in
the political arena whispering their denials. Both agencies
and clients lose under these conditions.
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APPENDIX I
Figure 1
A PLURALIST VIEW OF DECISION-MAKING
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APPENDIX II
Table 1
INTEREST GROUP INVOLVEMENT IN PUBLIC ISSUES

Issue Issue Issue Issue
I
II
III
IV

Organizations
Anti-Defamation League
American Jewish Committee
American Jewish Congress
ASPIRA
Citizens Committee for
Children
Community Service Society
Council Against Poverty
Brownsville Corporation
Haryou-Act
MPiD
United Bronx Parents
Council of Supervisors
and Administrators
N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense
Fund-Legal Action Center
New York Civil Liberties
Union
Puerto Rican Forum
Puerto Rican Educators
Public Education Association
United Federation of Teachers
United Parents Association
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Abstract
The covert processes in the interagency system in Anchorage
social services is the subject of this paper. The emphasis is on
(1) conflicts between explicit goals of planning and rationality in
social services and covert or hidden goals concerning protection of
organizational jurisdiction; (2) the structure of interagency power;
and (3) the socialization and regulation of member agencies' behavior.
The data for the study derive from focused interviews with agency
administrators and staff members and observations at community
planning meetings. The major finding of the study is that the
explicit goals of rationality, integration, and planning in social
services are subverted by other hidden goals concerning member
agencies' organizational survival interests. The domination of
these hidden goals shapes the interagency power, control, and
sanctioning system.
Introduction
Understanding the covert processes in the interagency system in
social services is the issue of this paper. The interagency system
refers here to both formal planning groups and informal but systematic interaction in the local social service community. The dominance of covert processes in the interagency system was revealed in
the course of research on the impact of Anchorage social agencies
on urban Alaska Natives (Eskimo, Indian, and Aleut).* As part of
that research, we examined the interagency system in terms of (1)
conflicts between explicit goals of planning and rationality in
social services and covert or hidden goals concerning protection of
organizational jurisdictions; (2) the structure of power; and (3)
socialization and regulation of members.
*This paper is adapted from one section of a report on the impact
of Anchorage social services on urban Natives (Jones, 1974). The
Anchorage social service study was funded under the Community Service
and Continuing Education Program, Title I, Higher Education Act of
1965.

Methods
Data for this paper, collected in Anchorage, Alaska in the
summer of 1973, derive from observations of four community planning
groups and interviews with thirty-three administrators and fortysix staff members, many of whom participated in these planning
groups. The four planning groups are: Ad Hoc Committee on Child
Abuse, Social Services Planning Group, Alcoholism Interagency Management Group, and Anchorage Manpower Planning Board. We used focused
interviews which were intensive and in-depth, lasting from one to
three hours; in some instances, informants were interviewed on two
or more occasions.
Goal Conflicts
Agency administrators and social workers representing administration are the primary participants in interagency planning in
Anchorage. Their actions in planning groups reflect the operation
of two sets of values. On the one hand, they are committed to the
professional goal of trying to increase the rationality and effectiveness of the social service system. This commitment prompts them
to initiate or to join in interagency planning. On the other hand,
they want to protect their own agency's jurisdiction. This interest
frequently induces them to oppose efforts to make services more
rational and effective. Individual participants usually resolve
this ambivalence by placing highest priority on planning goals when
their own agency jurisdictions are not threatened, and highest
priority on organizational survival interests when their territories
are endangered (Chetkow, 1967, 271-282, and Marris and Rein, 1969,
note the powerful influence of jurisdictional interests in planning).
Participants' fear that planning activities threaten their own
jurisdictions has a powerful influence on the planning process. It
is common for planning groups to assess the adequacy of member
agencies.
But this very act poses a threat. Although members of
an agency, let us say agency A, may be well aware of the inadequacies
and limitations of their services, they fear public exposure for
several reasons. First, public exposure carries the implication
that workers delivering the services are inept. Second, repeated
exposure could and has induced planning groups to recommend defunding
a service. This occurred in both the Alcoholism Interagency Management Group and the Manpower Planning Board. Third, exposing inadequacies of a service could prompt planning groups to sponsor the
establishment of a new agency for this purpose. The new agency may
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perform the service better than agency A or it may assume responsibility for related services, in both cases, threatening to reduce
agency A's jurisdiction. These threats engender conflict between
and within individuals, reflecting the incompatibilities between the
rational goals of planning and hidden goals regarding members'
organizational survival interests.
The meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee on Child Abuse dramatically illustrate this conflict. The Committee was organized by
persons concerned about gaps and inadequacies in the child protection unit in public welfare. The unit is so understaffed that
workers must handle a substantial portion of their work by telephone. In addition, the unit suffers from a dearth of necessary
resources. The Ad Hoc Committee identified an acute need to organize the following supplementary services: hot line for families in
crisis, crisis nursery, emergency shelters, emergency foster homes,
and parent aides to stay in clients' homes and help families over
crises.
The central contest in the group was between representatives
of welfare and those who pressed for the establishment of supplementary services sponsored by other agencies. A borough health
department representative sought the Committee's approval for a
It
child protection unit to be administered by the borough.
included a child protection coordinator, crisis nursery, and family
aide program. A church-sponsored agency, Alaska Children's Services,
solicited Committee approval for a crisis hot line to be accompanied
by a mobile team that visited families in crisis on the spot.
The persistence with which representatives of welfare opposed
these proposals suggests the force of organizational survival interests when threats to jurisdiction are perceived. Welfare representatives countered every proposal with commonly asserted objections
-- new services would lead to a duplication of services, they would
confuse clients about which service to call in an emergency, they
would promote the use of untrained social workers (welfare workers
themselves are not trained social workers). When these arguments
failed to convince other members of the Committee, representatives
of welfare fell back on their legal authority to handle child abuse
cases, implying that the state would not grant authority to services
not sponsored by the welfare department. This veiled threat also
failed to convince proponents of new services. Finally, in a more
direct assertion, representatives of welfare urged the Committee to
adopt its goal of strengthening the existing welfare department
rather than starting competing services. No one objected in principle to strengthening the existing welfare service, but years of
experience convinced members that the need for adequate child protection services is so acute that it cannot await the outcome of
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the long, arduous, and usually hopeless process of changing the
rigid welfare system. The conflict between proponents of new child
protection services and representatives of welfare was not resolved
during the period of this research or for a relatively long period
after it.
Conflict Containment
Conflicts such as the above are perceived as very threatening
to group members, and they devote strenuous efforts to containing
it, at least in its overt manifestations. Participants' efforts to
contain the conflict take the form of avoiding issues that seriously
threaten group cohesion, focusing instead on less controversial and
less important issues. Bachrach and Baratz (1970) propose the
concept, "the non-decision" to characterize this process. This
pattern of conflict avoidance gives planning a ritualistic quality
where members go through the motions of planning with little consequence to the existing organization and delivery of social services
(Warren, 1973:361 makes a similar point).
In the four planning groups observed, if an issue threatened
to disrupt the group, members tabled it or handled it under the
table rather than to covertly confront it. Members generally inhibited expressions of hostility, treating each other with politeness
and respect regardless of animosities that smoldered beneath the
surface and that were confided during the research interviews. In
some instances, the congeniality observed reflected long standing
friendship ties between members. But more importantly, this style
of consensus politics reflected the reality that participants are
part of the same system and have to protect the same interests. If
one agency's jurisdiction can be reduced or weakened, then so can
any other's. So everyone tends to play the same political game for
fear their turn is coming. Thus, planning becomes a ritual rather
than a medium for reform.
The Structure of Power
Planning participants' complicity in maintaining consensus at
the costs of the express goals of planning seems to reflect their
recognition of the underlying realities of interagency power relations. While there is no formal, publically acknowledged power
structure in the interagency system, there is an informal, implicit
one stemming from the degree of dominance and subordination in
agencies' relations to each other. All agencies are interdependent
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in the sense that they rely on one another for continual flow of

referrals (customers) which nurtures the entire social service
industry. But there are also differences in degrees of dependence
between agencies. Agencies with very limited resources are more
dependent on agencies with large resources than vice versa. If the
limited agency antagonizes an agency with larger resources, the
latter can and does in some instances retaliate by refusing service
to its referrals. This practice is suggested by the ubiquitous care
with which administrators from small agencies avoid antagonizing
those from more powerful ones even though they may claim, in private
conversation, to abhor some of the practices of the more powerful
agencies. There is also verbal testimony to this practice. For
example, an aggressive program director in a recently established
alcoholism facility who is also a member of a minority group charged
complicity among some of the groups involved in alcohol treatment
who refused service to his referrals.
He believed this was due to
his having antagonized members of the Alcoholism Interagency Management Group by playing an outspoken, truth-telling role, thereby
challenging the style of consensus politics.
Agencies with large resources also exert control over other
agencies through manipulation of funds and contracts. The Bureau
of Indian Affairs and state welfare grant a number of contracts to
other agencies. If these agencies with contracts antagonize their
sponsors, they risk jeopardizing their funds. Negotiations at the
Ad Hoc Committee's meetings reflected this implicit power relationship. Members could not afford to antagonize public welfare for
three reasons. First, since most member agencies are small scale
and frequently refer to welfare, the success of their efforts
requires maintaining harmonious relations with welfare. Second,
some of the member agencies are directly funded by state welfare.
Third, the Committee depends for its very legitimacy on state welfare which has accorded it official status as the planning group
for child protection. The recognition of this underlying power
relationship profoundly shaped the outcome in Committee deliberations. Initial efforts to supplement welfare services in child
protection were rather quickly dropped, and the planning group
proceeded to deal with less threatening issues such as public
information. Thus, consensus politics was achieved.
Socialization and Regulation of Members
Up to this point, we have discussed goal conflicts and interagency power relations in formal planning groups. The socialization
and regulation of members is apparent not only in formal planning
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groups but also in informal but systematic interactions in the
social service community, which we consider part of the interagency system.
While members of established agencies seem to accept the
political realities of the interagency system, representatives of
newer agencies, such as the program director in the alcohol treatement facility, sometimes challenge them. The very existence of the
newer agencies bespeaks challenge; for example, Native-run social
agencies are in business precisely to redistribute social service
resources. Regulation of this challenge becomes a central task of
the interagency system.
The interagency system's efforts to socialize new members
involves transmittal of three expectations. New members are
expected to accept (1) their limited jurisdictions without trying to
expand them in ways that further impinge on other's territories,
(2) the existing power structure in social services, and (3) the
prevalent leadership style of consensus politics.
The processes by which expectations are transmitted is subtle
and frequently invisible. It becomes highly visible, however, when
sanctions are invoked against new agencies that fail to become
properly socialized. The most striking illustration of this process
is a Native-run social agency's relations in the interagency system,
both in planning groups and in the larger social service community.
Challenge to the Interagency System
In 1970, encouraged by Nixon's policy statement on Indian selfdetermination and the Bureau of Indian Affairs' policy regarding
contracting Bureau services to Indian groups, Cook Inlet Native
Association, the largest Native organization in the state, sought to
establish itself as a provider of social services for Natives. To
this end, it applied for a contract to operate the Bureau's general
relief program and later, for the Bureau's employment assistance
program. Neither of these contracts was awarded. But in 1972, the
now defunct Anchorage Community Action Agency funded Cook Inlet
Native Association to operate an urban Native center. The Urban
Native Center subsequently received a Bureau contract to operate a
transportation service for enrollees in a manpower training program
and an Indian Health Service contract to administer the health aide
program in the Cook Inlet region. With these contracts and with
funds from the Community Action Agency which enabled it to establish
social service, manpower and airport assistance programs as well as
a craft shop and recreation center, Urban Native Center was in business. But the Center was not satisfied with this narrow juris-440-

diction. Conceiving itself as a comprehensive social service, it
sought additional funds and contracts for providing more services
regardless of the extant distribution of service domains.
The Center posed a strong challenge to the existing power
structure in the social service community when it assumed leadership
for organizing a planning council without consulting recognized and
established agency leaders. Shortly after this effort by the Center,
established agencies joined forces and organized a competitive
group, the Social Service Planning Group, which ultimately absorbed
the one started by the Center. Center representatives' activity in
the new group continued to challenge the status quo. For instance,
Center representatives demanded the establishment of a low income
board. Since the new group was established in part to ward off
control by low income groups such as the Center, it was not likely
to support the proposal for a low income board. Nevertheless,
because it is unpopular to oppose participation by the poor, members
of the new group did not openly reject the proposal. Instead, they
covertly subverted it by failing to follow through on the plan for
each member to bring low income persons to subsequent meetings.
The Center challenged the status quo in interagency power in
other ways. At the same time that it held a Bureau contract, the
Center's regional corporation filed a suit against the Bureau's
parent organization, Department of the Interior, regarding a land
claims suit. Center leaders thought this act may have seriously
alienated the Bureau.
The Center's conflicts were not confined to older established
agencies; they also occurred with more recent agencies such as the
Community Action Agency. The latter had also been a "have-not"
agency, but at the time of this study, having gained some acceptance
by the established social service community, it tended to behave
similarly to it when dealing with the Native Center. Although Community Action was only one of the Center's funding sources, it
insisted on having the authoritative role. The Center objected to
this. One conflict between the two groups centered around firing
prerogatives. Both groups insisted on having the final authority
to hire and fire Center personnel. Another conflict concerned the
composition of the Center's Board of Directors. Ironically, at the
same time that the Center was agitating the Social Service Planning
Group to establish a low income board, the Community Action Agency
was demanding greater representation by the poor on the Center's
Board. The Center considered its all-Native board about as representative of Alaskan poor as a board can be; the Community Action
Agency, however, required the Center board to have 51 percent poor
instead of the usual one-third poor, and to have actual poor instead
of the usual requirement for representatives of the poor.
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In addition to challenging the power structure in the interagency system, the Native Center also violated the prevailing style
of consensus politics by playing a defiant, truth-teller role.
Although Community Action Agency staff frequently played a similar
role, its leadership was unwilling to accept defiance from its
delegate agency, expecting Center representatives to be appreciative
supplicants. When Center representatives charged the Community
Action Agency with imposing impossible standards regarding a low
income board and subjecting them to undue harrassment, a Community
Action Agency official asked them how they dared defy him when he
controlled the purse strings. "We'll give it a darn good try," a
Center official replied. In recounting this incident to me, the
Community Action Agency official cast out his arms in a gesture of
despair, saying:
"How can they be so foolish as to bite the hand that feeds
them? It would be irresponsible for me to continue funding
people who don't know how to get along in this world. I
think I'll freeze their funds."
And forthwith, he did just that.
Clearly, the Native Center was not behaving in conformity with
the roles prescribed for it. It would not accept a role as supplicant, appreciative of the limited jurisdiction it had gained. It
challenged the existing power structure in the interagency system.
And it would not accept the prevailing leadership style of pretending
a harmony that did not exist.
Interagency Sanctioning System
In response to this socialization failure, the interagency
system invoked sanctions against the Center. While it is difficult
to prove that a particular outcome is due to a specific sanction,
the combined effects of agency responses to the Center in 1973 were
to threaten its very survival.
The most potent sanction, of course, is defunding. After freezing, then restoring, then threatening defunding for 1973, the
Community Action Agency finally gave the Center reduced funding,
eliminating the Center's social service program, representatives of
which were among the most outspoken challengers of the interagency
status quo.
The Native Center also lost its Bureau of Indian Affairs contract for transportation services, and according to a letter the
Center received from the Bureau in 1973, its applications for con-

tracts to operatd Bureau employment assistance and general relief
programs were not to be granted. After explaining that the Bureau
contracts office was understaffed and unable to process contracts,
the letter states:
...you must certainly be aware of the nature and volume
of work generated by the contract process... in your
interests and ours, we have no wish to initiate an
enterprise destined to failure (Bureau of Indian Affairs
Juneau Area Office to Anchorage Urban Native Center, July
6, 1973).
Further, all seventeen proposals for services submitted by the
Center to funding agencies were rejected. Speculating about the
reasons for the uniform rejections, a Center official said, "I think
our troubles began after our regional corporation filed a legal suit
against the Department of Interior."
Defunding and rejection of proposals are not the only sanctions
applied against the Center. A campaign of gossip to discredit the
Center was widespread within social service circles. Although
charges against the Center concerned events that are common in all
agencies, they were presented as uncontroverted evidence of the
Center's incompetence. When asked about the Center, many administrators and staff rejoined with accusations against it. Said one
administrator:
"They're sick, they're devious. It's because they are
so insecure. They're not trained, you know, and that
makes them supersensitive and defensive."
Lack of training and incompetence were common charges against the
Center staff, yet the majority of people implementing social services
in Anchorage are not trained social workers. Agencies seem to have
little trouble accepting untrained personnel in their own agencies,
and incompetence has not become an issue in those agencies. Another
charge against the Center focused on conflict between Center administrators and a Center staff member. This conflict was a major topic
of conversation in social service circles and was treated as a unique
phenomenon, yet I encountered no agencies that were free of internal
conflict.
This discrediting tactic against the Native Center proved very
effective. Few agencies referred clients there. When asked about
their reasons for failing to refer clients to the Center, respondents
invoked the standard criticism of incompetence and lack of training
(few had ever visited the Center). In effect, then, a boycott was
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imposed against the Center, weakening its potential for attracting
new funds and contracts.
Later, after the research for this study was completed, the
local sanctions against the Native Center became ineffective because
of federal policies. The growing federal emphasis on Indian selfdetermination proved a more powerful factor than the local interagency system, and funds from the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Indian
Health Services, and other federal agencies became available to the
Native Center. Without these federal policies, the Native Center
would not likely have survived.
In sum, the sanctioning system in the Anchorage interagency
system operates both formally and informally, and the two modes are
closely intertwined and complementary. Funding and contractor
agencies impaired the Center's functioning by withdrawing or refusing funds, and the informal interagency system further undermined
the Center by a discrediting tactic that stigmatized the Center and
excluded it from the interagency referral system.
The Anchorage interagency system, in both formal planning and
informal agency relations, is engaged in a very active process of
regulating behavior of member agencies. This regulation serves to
protect the interests of established agencies in the community more
than to promote the express goals of planning -- integrating and
rationalizing social services. Planning tends to assume the form
of a ritual not because bureaucrats have a special inclination for
ceremonies but because of the predominance of their interests in
protecting their domains and the interorganizational status quo. The
social service community operates as an interagency system in socializing members to the realities of interagency power and the norms of
consensus politics, and regulates behavior by imposing sanctions
against recalcitrant or rebellious members.
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